the weekly Standard

DECEMBER 19, 2005

$3.95

THE GRAYING OF THE 'GREENING OF AMERICA'
DAVID SKINNER

FIGHTING TO WIN

With the proper strategy, victory in Iraq is far more likely than many think

BY FREDERICK W. KAGAN

*****AUTO**5-DIGIT 94301
#UNZ0555B096 1#302604 WK P4
RON UNZ JUL 17 06
555 BRYANT ST 371
PALO ALTO CA 94301-1704

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



PRODUCTION LINES VS. UNEMPLOYMENT LINES

WHICH WILL WIN OUT AT THE WTO TALKS?

When U.S. trade negotiators head to Hong Kong this week for the World Trade Organization talks, there's a lot at stake. In the past five years, our manufacturing sector has lost three million jobs due largely to dumping, currency manipulation and foreign subsidies.

By defending our trade laws, we can keep U.S. manufacturing strong and competitive.

American manufacturers can win a fair fight against anyone in the world.
It's up to our negotiators to see that they get the chance.

DON'T TRADE AWAY OUR TRADE LAWS

STAND UP FOR STEEL

WWW.STANDUPFORSTEEL.ORG

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contents

December 19, 2005 • Volume 11, Number 14

2 Scrapbook . . . *John F. Burns, the* New Republic, *and more.*

4 Casual . . . . . *Joseph Epstein, carnivore.*

5 Correspondence . . . . . *On torture and Bear Bryant.*

7 Editorial . . . . . *Solomonic Nonsense*

Articles

10 Eighty Percent of What? *A questionable poll on what Iraqis really want.* . . . . . BY FRED BARNES

12 Down the Memory Hole *The Pentagon sits on the documents of the Saddam Hussein regime.* . . . . . BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

14 A Slow Pearl Harbor *Some disasters are a long time in the making.* . . . . . BY JAMES JOHNSON AND ROBERT ZARATE

15 The Dictator and the Congressman *Rep. Bill Delahunt warms up to Venezuela's strongman.* . . . . . BY DUNCAN CURRIE

17 Read Pamuk's Novels *They're smarter about Turkey and Europe than his political pronouncements.* . . . . BY BART J. SPRUYT

19 One China, One Taiwan *Bush's democracy-promotion doctrine doesn't square with his China policy.* . . . . BY ELLEN BORK

Features

21 Fighting to Win

With the proper strategy, victory in Iraq is more likely than people think. . . BY FREDERICK W. KAGAN

27 The Graying of 'The Greening of America'

Charles Reich's famous book turns 35, but seems as juvenile as ever. . . . . . BY DAVID SKINNER

Members of the 1st Battalion, Sixth Marines, sweep a rural target during Operation Dagger, June 18, 2005, in Anbar Province, Iraq.
Getty Images / Chris Hondros

Books & Arts

33 America's Critic *Edmund Wilson, mandarin in chief.* . . . . . BY JAMES SEATON

37 Ode to Joy *Freedom was Friedrich Schiller's muse.* . . . . . BY ALGIS VALIUNAS

41 Keeping it Real *From Schubert to Shakur, musical violence is an old story.* . . . . . BY JOE QUEENAN

43 THE STANDARD READER . . . . . *Quirky Christmas Reader Special.*

44 Parody . . . . . *Israel Relocated to Western Europe.*

William Kristol, *Editor* **Fred Barnes,** *Executive Editor*
Claudia Anderson, Richard Starr, *Managing Editors*
David Tell, *Opinion Editor* **Christopher Caldwell, Andrew Ferguson,** *Senior Editors*
Philip Terzian, *Books & Arts Editor* **Stephen F. Hayes, Matt Labash,** *Senior Writers* **Matthew Continetti,** *Staff Writer*
Victorino Matus, David Skinner, *Assistant Managing Editors* **Jonathan V. Last,** *Online Editor* **Daniel McKivergan,** *Online Foreign Editor*
Sonny Bunch, *Assistant Editor* **Duncan Currie,** *Reporter* **Michael Goldfarb, Joseph Lindsley,** *Editorial Assistants*
Lev Nisnevitch, *Art Director* **Philip Chalk,** *Production Director*
Paul Weisner, *Finance Director* **Catherine Lowe,** *Marketing Director* **Taybor Cook,** *Office Manager*
Carolyn Wimmer, *Executive Assistant* **Anastasia Uglova,** *Staff Assistant*
Gerard Baker, Max Boot, Joseph Bottum, Tucker Carlson, John J. DiIulio Jr., Noemie Emery, Joseph Epstein, David Frum, David Gelernter, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Brit Hume, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, Tod Lindberg, P. J. O'Rourke, John Podhoretz, Irwin M. Stelzer, *Contributing Editors*
Terry Eastland, *Publisher*

the weekly Standard

THE WEEKLY STANDARD (ISSN 1083-3013) is published weekly (except the first week in January, third week in April, second week in July, fourth week in August, and the second week in November) by News America Incorporated, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. For subscription customer service in the United States, call 1-800-274-7293. For new subscription orders, please call 1-800-283-2014. Subscribers: Please send new subscription orders to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96153, Washington, DC 20090-6153; changes of address to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. Please include your latest magazine mailing label. Allow 3 to 5 weeks for arrival of first copy and address changes. Yearly subscriptions, $78.00. Canadian/foreign orders require additional postage and must be paid in full prior to commencement of service. Canadian/foreign subscribers may call 1-902-563-4723 for subscription inquiries. Visa/MasterCard payment accepted. Cover price, $3.95. Back issues, $3.95 (includes postage and handling). Send letters to the editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, DC 20036-4617. For a copy of THE WEEKLY STANDARD Privacy Policy, visit www.weeklystandard.com or write to Customer Service, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036. Copyright 2005, News America Incorporated. All rights reserved. No material in THE WEEKLY STANDARD may be reprinted without permission of the copyright owner. THE WEEKLY STANDARD is a trademark of News America Incorporated.

BPA INTERNATIONAL

www.weeklystandard.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Crime and Punishment, Iraqi-style

Never let it be said that THE SCRAPBOOK has no kind words for the *New York Times*. Even before the United States invaded Iraq, the paper's veteran foreign correspondent John F. Burns was on the ground in Baghdad, filing articles that dripped with telling details, sharp insight, and—most important—moral sanity.

Burns is still there, and his reporting is still leagues above the competition. Just consider his December 8 dispatch on Saddam Hussein's half brother and codefendant, Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti. Like Saddam, al-Tikriti has done his best to disrupt the courtroom. Last week, Burns reports, "in a 10-minute lecture from the dock," al-Tikriti

> equated the defendants' privations in an American military detention center near Baghdad with the violence and hardships inflicted on victims of Mr. Hussein's repression in the former government's interrogation centers and prisons, as they have been described by witnesses at the trial. These have included, in one instance, seeing a grinding machine that had been used to crush a prisoner's head and, in another, the execution of a 14-year-old boy.

That's nothing, though, said al-Tikriti, compared with what he's been going through:

> Among the "incredible punishments" cited by Mr. Ibrahim—who was chief of the Mukhabarat intelligence agency in the early 1980s, at the time of the killings, torture, and deportations that the prosecution alleges—was being restricted to six of "the worst cigarettes in the world" per day.
>
> Mr. Ibrahim, 54, listed other privations including, in the first months after he was arrested in April 2003, being forced by American troops to take his daily exercise outside in the 130-degree noontime heat of the Baghdad summer and 4 A.M. in the cold of the desert winter. On top of this, he said, American soldiers guarding the former Iraqi leaders served them "food that should not be given to beggars."

Burns, it should be noted, has won two Pulitzer prizes, one for his coverage of the Balkan wars, the other for his coverage of the Taliban. He's past due for a third. ♦

Not Fit to Print?

One of the best *New Republic* articles in recent years didn't appear in the *New Republic*. It was by Harvard law professor William J. Stuntz and was called "Noble Cause: Brief Wars Rarely Produce Lasting Results. Long Wars Often Do." It appeared last week, not in the magazine's print edition, which apparently had no room for it, but only on the TNR website. Here are a few highlights from Stuntz's very interesting argument (you can read the whole thing at *www.tnr.com*):

"Brief wars rarely produce permanent results, but long wars often do. Had McClellan's army taken Richmond and ended the war early in 1862, slavery and secessionism would have survived, and 'the South shall rise again' would have been a prediction rather than a slogan. . . .

"What would have happened had the second Iraq war turned out like the first, as the White House apparently expected? Saddam would have been toppled, the Iraqi people would have celebrated, order would have been restored quickly, followed by a speedy exit for British and American troops. Then what? Maybe the rule of Iran-style Shia mullahs, perhaps another brutal Sunni autocrat to take the place of the last one, possibly an endless civil war between the two. Today, there is a real chance of a vastly better result—precisely *because* the insurgency survived, because it *wasn't* quickly defeated. Sunni intransigence needed to be crushed slowly; a quick in-and-out war was not enough to kill the dream of forever tyrannizing Iraqi Kurds and Shia. More important, thousands of senseless murders over the past 32 months have taught Iraqis—Sunni, Shia, and Kurd alike—just how vicious Zarqawi and his allies are. That lesson will have very useful consequences for the long-term health of the region. . . .

"Thankfully, Lincoln saw to it that the war's purpose changed. George W. Bush has changed the purpose of his war too, though the change seems more the product of our enemies' choices than of Bush's design. By prolonging the war, Zarqawi and his Baathist allies have drawn thousands of terrorist wannabes into the fight—against both our soldiers *and* Muslim civilians.

"When terrorists fight American civilians, as on September 11, they can leverage their own deaths to kill a great many of us. But when terrorists fight American *soldiers*, the odds tilt towards our side. Equally important, by bringing the fight to a Muslim land, by making that land the central front of the war on Islamic terrorism, the United States has effectively forced Muslim terrorists to kill *Muslim* civilians. That is why the so-called Arab street is rising—not against us but against the terrorists, as we saw in Jordan after Zarqawi's disastrous hotel bombing. The population of the Islamic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world is choosing sides not between jihadists and Westerners, but between jihadists and people just like themselves. We are, slowly but surely, converting bin Laden's war into a *civil* war—and that is a war bin Laden and his followers cannot hope to win." ♦

But How Do You Really Feel?

Baited by a fellow lefty for the thought crime of association with neocons at the group blog *Pajamas-Media.com*, Marc Cooper, a contributing editor to the *Nation*, offered the sort of pungent assessment of his colleagues that sometimes turns contributing editors into former contributing editors:

> Perhaps you would like me to catalogue the . . . wingnuttiness that I bump into day-to-day at my more respectable job with *The Nation*: writers who believe that there's a burgeoning national Russ Feingold for President movement; that Castro's Cuba is really more democratic than Schwarzenegger's California; that it's a pity the Soviet Union collapsed; that a new book critical of Mao must be written by the CIA; that it's just fine and dandy to have an anti-war movement managed by acolytes of Kim-Il Sung; that we must provide material support to the armed resistance in Iraq, [and] so on and so on ad infinitum. ♦

Arian Nation

In courtroom news, THE SCRAPBOOK admits to surprise last week when Tampa Bay jurors declined to convict former University of South Florida computer science professor and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Sami Al-Arian—or his three codefendants—on any of the 53 counts of conspiracy, membership in a terrorist cell, andrelated crimes that the federal government had charged them with in February 2003. Jurors acquitted Al-Arian of conspiracy to murder people overseas, but deadlocked on three other charges. Justice Department lawyers must now decide whether to push for a retrial of the deadlocked charges, or just deport Al-Arian and try to forget the whole thing ever happened.

We weren't the only ones surprised at this outcome. Writes *New York Times* Justice Department correspondent Eric Lichtblau: "Federal officials in Washington expressed surprise at the verdict in a case they had pursued for years." Maybe the feds should have tried reading blogger Debbie Schlussel, who predicted on October 28 that Al-Arian would walk.

"Yesterday, Al-Arian's defense lawyer rested without presenting a case in the ongoing trial against him," Schlussel wrote on her eponymous site, *www.debbieschlussel.com*. "Speculation is that he didn't have to." The problem was, she went on, "after months and months of testimony, media reports say jurors' eyes are glazing over daily. Clearly, prosecutors bored them. . . . It will be a travesty of justice if Al-Arian walks," Schlussel concluded. But "it will be no surprise." She turned out to be right on the money. What a shame. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Casual

Fat Moe, Hot Doug, and Big Herm

The sign, in red letters on a yellow awning, reading "Moe's Maxwell Street Polish" caught my eye as I drove past. I remember the smell of those Polish sausages, and especially of the onions, grilling on a winter's day on Maxwell Street, the old peddler's open-air market in the Chicago of my boyhood. Polio Sausage, we used jokingly to call it, for it seemed slightly dangerous—not to mention *trayf* to the highest power—even to my boyhood gang of semi-ruffians, all of us Jewish, none from Kosher-keeping homes. I made a mental note to return to the restaurant, whose proper name is Fat Moe's.

The Polish sausages and onions on the grill at Fat Moe's did not, regrettably, give off that same stirring smell. The place is what the English call a take-away: You order at one of two windows and take your sandwiches off in brown bags. Fat Moe himself was not on the premises, I was told by a man who called himself Thin Moe. When I inquired just how fat Fat Moe was, he reported, disappointingly to me, only that he was losing weight. I hate to see a man lose his sobriquet.

My friend and I took our sandwiches to a nearby park, where we ate them seated on a bench, the wind at our backs. The sandwiches were good, though not memorable, and the French fries notably greasy, for which, as a connoisseur of Chicago grub, I never deduct points. The paper napkins, as is always the case at such joints, were small and of course too few. Proudly I report that I left no mustard on the red sweater I was wearing, though I cannot vouch for my lips, chin, and cheeks. Pity that Manet wasn't there to paint us.

Fast food doesn't quite define the kind of food served at Fat Moe's, though they serve it up quickly enough. Junk food doesn't feel right, either. Certainly it doesn't qualify as comfort food: not in our time of cholesterol terror. Male food is the way I think of it: It is for men who like coarse blatant flavors, juicy, spicy, rich, greasy, and sloppy. Men are brutes, information I continually press upon my granddaughter, and if she could have seen her grandfather attack Fat Moe's Polish sausage sandwich the point would have required no further repetition.

Darren Gygi

I limit myself severely in my visits to joints like Fat Moe's, going to them perhaps once a month. Not long ago I discovered another, in an out-of-the-way Chicago neighborhood, called Hot Doug's. Doug, a man who looks to be in his late thirties, is a sausage specialist who likes to name his sandwiches after his friends ("The Paul Kelly. Bratwurst soaked in beer—sort of like Paul"), Chicago athletes, and entertainers ("The Don Rickles. Thuringer: Beef, pork, and garlic—you'll like it, you hockey puck"). The crowd at Doug's is very Chicagoan: of good cheer, unpretentious, and tending toward the heavyset. Chicago is a city where they don't hold it against a fellow if he happens to be twenty or thirty (all right, make that forty or fifty) pounds overweight. I modestly had a Shawon Dunston ("Chicken sausage, zesty Italian style") and an order of excellent fries. On Fridays and Saturdays the *spécialité de la maison* at Hot Doug's is fries cooked in duck fat. I have yet to sample these, never having felt sufficiently suicidal.

I don't go much any more to Big Herm's, which a witty friend calls *L'Hermitage*. I've always found the atmosphere rather glum. Not too many guys under 250 are there; most of them are munching on Italian beef-sausage combo sandwiches, sweet peppers added. The clientele has the look of a waiting room for depressed former National Football League interior linemen, now in therapy.

Big Herm at one point sold the joint, then moved in next door, putting up a sign that read "The Original Herm's," which seemed far from fair play, even in the Chicago sandwich wars. Driving by the other day, I noted that only one Herm's is left, calling itself "Herm's Place." Whether this is owned by the original or unoriginal Herm is a mystery I am prepared to leave unsolved.

The greater mystery is why I continue to yearn for such food—I, who do not weigh 140 pounds. That it continues to exist is attractive to me in itself. I'm also pleased to know that people are still eating outside the laws of the health police. In my own neighborhood, just a block or so away, Al's, which advertises itself as "#1 Italian Beef,"—an accolade given it by *Chicago* magazine—is about to move in. A few blocks away there is Merle's, a Texas-style barbeque joint, specializing in ribs.

Even if I do not eat this food regularly, I like the notion that it is still there, well within my reach should the desire for it hit me. I once heard a chubby female comedian describe herself as a bulimic, but without the throwing up part. I guess I'm a glutton, but without the eating part.

Joseph Epstein

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tortured Debate

Charles Krauthammer's "The Truth about Torture" (Dec. 5) is a reasoned and eloquently written argument, except when he criticizes the practice of providing "those who kill innocents in the name of Islam with precisely the document [i.e., the Koran] that inspires their barbarism."

To say that the Koran itself inspires barbarism suggests that responsibility for a terrorist's unforgivable acts of violence lies within the pages of Islam's holy book. While terrorists may claim that they commit these grave atrocities in the name of Islam, it is neither the religion nor its text that promotes or sanctions their depravity. Rather, it is their attempt to legitimize their actions through a distorted and perverted interpretation of their faith and its scripture. Similarly, it is not the Bible or Christianity that encourages certain individuals to kill doctors who perform abortions, nor is it Judaism or the Torah that incites extremists to shoot and attack Palestinians. Krauthammer's words advance an understanding of Islam and the Koran that is not only inaccurate but also deeply offensive to Muslims, the vast majority of whom follow their faith's peaceful affirmations. Muslim Americans struggle against damaging and injurious stereotypes, and Krauthammer's brief mention of the Koran contributes to such destructive perceptions of Islam.

Rev. Clark Lobenstine
Washington, D.C.

I have been a pastor for over ten years, and I must admit that torture seems to go against my faith. Yet it is hard to dispute the greater good that must be sought in ascertaining necessary information to save hundreds if not thousands of lives. I wholeheartedly and yet regrettably agree with Charles Krauthammer's piece. It is very difficult to digest; unfortunately, such is the world in which we live.

Rev. David Hernandez
Sanford, Maine

Charles Krauthammer rightly objects to blanket denunciations of torture as a tool for gathering urgent information on impending terrorist acts. But the only example he cites of extreme torture actually producing the desired result—the kidnapping of Israeli corporal Nachshon Waxman—ended in a

failed rescue attempt, and hardly fits the profile of what most reasonable people would deem a legitimate exception to an outright ban on torture.

Fortunately, plenty such examples can be found in the fictional, ticking-time-bomb world of TV's *24*. If there is one thing this Fox thriller has taught us, it is that torture, in extreme situations, can work. But even *24*, which among "reality-based" TV shows has the least liberal outlook on current affairs, began portraying torture's limits this year. As if responding to the horrors of Abu Ghraib, the most hawkish depiction of interrogation techniques on the tube began to explore what can go wrong during torture: To stop the pain, people will say anything, and, worse, you can eletrocute the wrong person. Krauthammer fails to address these serious pitfalls of any torture-based interrogation technique. What good does it do the millions of residents of New York City if the captured terrorist leads the police on a wild goose chase, just to save his thumbs?

Andy Guess
Ithaca, N.Y.

Bear Bios

I am most appreciative to Victor Gold for his glowing review of my biography of Paul "Bear" Bryant, *The Last Coach* ("When The Bear Was King," Nov. 21). I would, however, like to correct a minor error. Gold states that my book is "no less than the fifth biography" of Coach Bryant. It is, in fact, the second. Keith Dunnavant's 1996 book is the only previous work on Bryant to come properly under the heading of "biography." There have been numerous memoirs about Bryant, as well as Bryant's own autobiography (which covered the first 29 years of his 38-year career), but no other biographies.

Allen Barra
South Orange, N.J.

• • •

The Weekly Standard
welcomes letters to the editor.
All letters should be addressed:
Correspondence Editor
The Weekly Standard
1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505
Washington, DC 20036.

You may also fax letters: (202) 293-4901
or email: editor@weeklystandard.com.

Advertising Sales

*For more information, visit **weeklystandard.com**, click on the **About Us** button at the top, and select **Advertise**.*

Peter Dunn, *Associate Publisher*
pdunn@weeklystandard.com; 202-496-3334
Patrick F. Doyle, *West Coast Advertising Manager*
pdoyle@weeklystandard.com; 415-777-4383
Don Eugenio, *Midwest Advertising Manager*
deugenio@weeklystandard.com; 312-953-7236
Nicholas H.B. Swezey, *Advertising & Marketing Manager; nswezey@weeklystandard.com; 202-496-3355*
Johan Schersten, *Foreign Country Reports*
johan@us-impact.com; 011-31-62-360-3690
Meghan Hawthorne, *Advertising & Marketing Assistant*
mhawthorne@weeklystandard.com; 202-496-3350

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ENERGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

COAL

Today's technologies can convert U.S. coal into:

Clean Electricity to power growing cities.



Transportation Fuels to keep our economy moving.

Natural Gas to warm homes and families in winter.

Hydrogen to energize fuel cells of tomorrow.

Yeah... coal can do that.

Today, coal fuels more than 50% of U.S. electricity. America has the largest coal reserves in the world... and greater use of this clean and affordable fuel can reduce our reliance on foreign oil and liquefied natural gas.

Peabody Energy (NYSE: BTU) is the world's largest provider of coal to fuel 21st Century energy solutions.

CoalCanDoThat.com

Peabody

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the weekly Standard

Solomonic Nonsense

Last Tuesday the Supreme Court heard oral argument in *Rumsfeld* v. *Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights*. Rumsfeld, of course, is the secretary of defense. FAIR, as it's more commonly known, is a coalition of 36 law school and faculty groups, backed by friend-of-the-court briefs from organizations representing dozens of other law school and faculty groups, as well. At issue is the so-called Solomon Amendment, a congressional enactment under which American universities, in order to retain eligibility for most forms of federal funding, must provide military recruitment officers the same level of assistance and campus access that every other prospective employer routinely enjoys.

FAIR and its allies would very much prefer to withhold such cooperation from the Pentagon—concerned as they are about the underlying "immorality" of anti-homosexual bias in Defense Department hiring practices. But since no serious research university can nowadays survive without its federal aid, neither can any such university permit its law school to imperil that aid by obstructing the Judge Advocate General's corps when it shows up to conduct on-campus job interviews. So our law professors are made to stand down, and our law schools are made to look hypocritical, more interested in money than principle. Thus does the Solomon Amendment violate the legal academy's constitutional right—and professional obligation—to keep faith with, and properly propound, the true meaning of "equality, justice, and human dignity."

That, at least, was the argument FAIR attorney Joshua Rosenkranz spent half an hour attempting to defend before the Supreme Court last week. But something went horribly awry along the way, and by the time he was done, it seemed clear not just that FAIR's case was hopeless—Rosenkranz will be lucky to win even a single justice's vote—but that it was positively inane. The question arises: How could America's law schools have collectively embraced such an embarrassing farce?

Consider, for example, Rosenkranz's brief exchange with Justice Breyer about the possible limits of FAIR's asserted First Amendment privilege to resist, or even actively disobey, a statute its members find obnoxious. Breyer wanted to clarify whether this purported right was something uniquely possessed by tenured law professors who don't like "don't ask, don't tell"—or, instead, whether there was some neutral and generally applicable principle that Rosenkranz was identifying.

> BREYER: And so, in fact, to be clear. You also think schools that are angry at the military because they are too *favorable* to gays in the military, they have the same right?
>
> ROSENKRANZ: Absolutely, your honor.
>
> BREYER: Also the same right, Bob Jones University, because they disapprove of social mixing of the races?
>
> ROSENKRANZ: To answer the first hypothetical first, if that's a matter of conscience, absolutely.
>
> BREYER: And there are a lot of people in the country, they may take this view, anyway, they may not believe in either affirmative action, they may not believe in diversity, they may even believe in racial segregation for all I know. I hope there're not too many, but there might, and those people all have the same right?
>
> ROSENKRANZ: They have the same First Amendment right.

Murmuring arose throughout the Supreme Court chamber at this point—the way it often does when inexperienced attorneys allow themselves to be maneuvered, under questioning, into damaging "concessions" they don't actually intend.

Amazingly enough, though, Rosenkranz's embrace of the "racial segregation" analogy for his clients' treatment of Pentagon recruiters *was not a mistake*. He had already briefed the Court on precisely this point: "[T]here can be circumstances . . . where discrimination is so integral to an organization's identity, or to the message its members have gathered to communicate, that the right not to associate trumps even the government's weighty interest in opposing discrimination." Here, FAIR's counsel of record specifically suggested that Justice Breyer and his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

colleagues consult *Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan* v. *Mayor of Thurmont*—a 17-year-old Maryland district court case meant, one presumes, to stand for the proposition that law school professors can't be compelled to welcome uniformed servicemen into their ambit—just as the "Ku Klux Klan cannot be forced to admit Jews or African-Americans to its ranks or to its parades."

Think about that for a moment: Thirty-six leading law schools, on the assumption that doing so would *help* them, have just advised the United States Supreme Court that contemporary American legal education bears meaningful comparison to a Klan assembly.

Well, let us count the ways—a couple of them anyhow.

Paranoia and Self-absorption: Included in the *Rumsfeld* case file is a declaration by Boston College Law School student Gerald V. May III in which he remembers that dark, awful day back in the fall of 2002 when the Solomon Amendment finally broke his professors' will. "I had to directly confront the presence of discrimination on campus. Watching JAG recruiters casually walk down the hallways and sip free coffee provided by the Career Services Center gave me a sickening feeling." And May is hardly alone, according to FAIR. "Discourse has suffered" at law schools all over the country. The "academic environment is . . . poisoned." Professors "attest to student expressions of cynicism" whenever classroom discussion turns to "topics such as equality, human dignity, and other underpinnings of a just society." Meanwhile, off campus, a "raging national debate" is purportedly underway about JAG corps recruitment of freshly minted lawyers.

Stupidity: American higher education can claim no constitutional entitlement to federal grants and contracts per se, FAIR acknowledges. But that money has now been linked by statute to university cooperation in the government's effort to fulfill its constitutionally mandated responsibility to raise and support an army. Various universities mean to refuse such cooperation, and undermine that effort, as a vehicle for the expression of their views about the civil rights of gay people. Views about the civil rights of gay people are protected by the First Amendment. Therefore—the law schools' mindbogglingly illogical argument proceeds—the government is constitutionally required to let universities actively obstruct the Pentagon's on-campus volunteer-force recruitment campaign, free from the "crisis of conscience" that a threatened financial penalty might inspire. This, even though no one disputes the fact that the government could, if it wanted to, forcibly conscript every law student in the land without ever having spent a single dime on higher education.

One wonders what kind of lawyers they are, exactly, who graduate from institutions that teach such nonsense.

Maybe the Pentagon shouldn't actually want to commission these people all that much to begin with?

—David Tell, for the Editors

Michael Ramirez

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What Does This Stand For?



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eighty Percent of What?

A questionable poll on what Iraqis really want.

BY FRED BARNES

THE POLL NUMBER—80 percent of Iraqis want Americans out of their country—has become a staple of Democratic antiwar rhetoric. Representative John Murtha cited it in his proposed House resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. Democratic national chairman Howard Dean mentioned it in the radio interview in which he said the war in Iraq is unwinnable. Senator Barbara Boxer put it this way on *Fox News Sunday*: "Eighty percent of Iraqis want us gone." Senator John Kerry made reference to the poll number in responding to a speech on Iraq by Vice President Cheney last month.

Democrats may be oblivious, but there are reasons to be skeptical of the 80 percent figure. Does it actually reflect support among Iraqis for immediate withdrawal? Probably not. Or have Democrats misconstrued its meaning to justify their demand for the removal of American forces from Iraq, in Murtha's words, "as soon as possible"? It sure looks that way.

There's no doubt about the authenticity of the opinion survey from which this particular finding emerged. That poll was conducted secretly by an Iraqi university for the British military in August. And the poll's results were disclosed in October by Sean Rayment, the defense correspondent for the *Sunday Telegraph* in London.

The problem with the 80 percent figure—actually, 82 percent were said to be "strongly opposed" to "coalition forces in Iraq"—is threefold. One, it clashes with the demographics of Iraq. Two, it's at odds with other polls in Iraq. And three, the question that elicited the 82 percent response is vague, which means the response is ambiguous.

The population of Iraq is made up of Sunnis (20 percent), Shia (60 percent), and Kurds (20 percent). The Sunnis in the poll would no doubt say they strongly oppose "the presence" of the American-led coalition in Iraq and favor instant withdrawal. It was the Sunnis and their leader, Saddam Hussein, who ruled Iraq for decades before being overthrown by coalition forces in 2003. The Shia, on the other hand, were persecuted by Saddam and thus were happy to see him and his colleagues ousted. The Kurds were even more viciously persecuted and are downright pro-American. So the obvious conclusion, based on Iraq's demographics and simple math, is that 82 percent of Iraqis probably do want Americans to leave eventually, but that they don't favor immediate withdrawal.

If we knew the "internals" of the poll's sample, we could say for sure whether 82 percent of a representative sample of Iraqis said they favored immediate withdrawal. I contacted Rayment, who broke the poll story, and learned the sample size (1,264 Iraqis), but not the breakdown of Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds. That remains unknown, at least publicly. It matters, though. If the sample consisted disproportionately of Sunnis, for example, that would explain a high number of respondents who want U.S. forces to withdraw immediately. However, it wouldn't be a faithful reflection of overall Iraqi opinion.

Earlier polls tell a different (and clearer) story, though still not one that's favorable to keeping American troops in Iraq indefinitely. In March 2004, a BBC poll of 2,500 Iraqis found that 51 percent opposed the continued presence of coalition troops in their country. And in May 2004, a poll in six Iraqi cities, including ones with significant Sunni populations, put the percentage of Iraqis who want coalition forces to "leave immediately" at 41 percent. And 55 percent said they would feel safer if those forces left.

The wording of the question in the poll cited by Democrats is important. It is: "Do you support the presence of coalition forces in Iraq?" It's likely the vast majority of Iraqis would like to see foreign troops leave Iraq at some point. Even President Bush and the Pentagon insist that American forces should be withdrawn as the Iraqi military and security personnel grow and are able to operate effectively on their own.

But an Iraqi who answers "strongly opposed" to coalition troops in Iraq isn't necessarily in favor of immediate withdrawal—quite the contrary. The six-city poll last year found, for instance, that while 41 percent wanted a quick withdrawal, another 45 percent favored the departure of coalition forces after the establishment of a permanent Iraqi government. This is roughly in line with the desire of the Bush administration to begin troop reductions in 2006.

Iraqis, however, disagree with a core premise of the Democratic calls for immediate withdrawal—at least according to the polls. They do not buy the notion that the United States has lost in Iraq and that things are getting worse there—hence, the need for U.S. forces to withdraw as quickly as possible.

The polling of Iraqis since the ouster of Saddam in April 2003 shows a consistent streak of overall optimism. A poll last month conducted by an Iraqi firm showed that 53 percent of Iraqis believe "things will be better" in six months, while 65 percent believe this will be true in one

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It Stands For Reaching Out.

We're AstraZeneca, and we discover innovative medicines designed to make your life better. We approach every challenge with the same question: How do we enhance your health, your family's health and the health of your community? That forces us to face some of the most challenging issues in healthcare today.

It's why we are leaders in supporting the implementation of the historic Medicare Modernization Act. We believe understanding the new benefit and the important choices that will help seniors access their medicines is a matter of public health. So AstraZeneca is reaching out with resources and training for physicians and pharmacists. Empowering employees to educate their friends and family. Supporting organizations so they can better reach seniors at the local level.

We don't have all the answers yet, but we understand that our role is not just to discover and provide medicines, but also to educate — to work together to enhance your health, your family's health and the health of your community. That's what AstraZeneca stands for. To learn more, log on to www.astrazeneca-us.com.

AstraZeneca

www.astrazeneca-us.com

©2005 AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

year and 72 percent think so in five years.

Iraqis have been asked the same question often used to gauge American sentiment: Is your country headed in the right direction? In a poll last month, 49 percent of Iraqis said right direction, up from 43 percent in September but down from 67 percent in April. This compares with only 31 percent of Americans who think the United States is on the right track, according to a poll in early December by CBS News and the *New York Times*.

Here's what I think we should conclude from all this: Iraqis want foreign forces, mostly Americans, out eventually, but a majority, or something very close to one, would wait until an Iraqi government is firmly established and able to ward off insurgents. This is a sensible position and quite different from the story Democrats are telling. ♦

Celebrate the 10th Anniversary of

The Weekly Standard

with a provocative and insightful collection of the decade's best writing from a who's who of the nation's leading political minds.



HarperCollins*Publishers* www.harpercollins.com

Down the Memory Hole

Why is the Pentagon sitting on the documents of the Saddam Hussein regime? BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

FOR THE SECOND TIME in recent weeks the Department of Defense has denied a request from THE WEEKLY STANDARD to release *unclassified* documents recovered in postwar Iraq. These documents apparently reveal, in some detail, activities of Saddam Hussein's regime in the years before the war. This second denial could also be the final one: According to two Pentagon sources, the program designed to review, translate, and analyze data from the old Iraqi regime may be shuttered at the end of December, not just placing the documents beyond the reach of journalists, but also making them inaccessible to policymakers.

As a consequence, the ongoing debate over the Iraq war and its origins is taking place without crucial information about the former Iraqi regime and its relationships with presumed U.S. allies and known U.S. enemies. Despite the determined shredding and burning efforts of regime officials in the dying days of Saddam Hussein's government, much of this information still exists—in handwritten documents, in videotapes and audiotapes, in photographs and satellite images, on computer hard drives. All told, the U.S. government has in its possession more than 2 million "exploitable" items from the former Iraqi regime (the intelligence community's term of art for information it thinks might be useful). According to sources with knowledge of the project, now two and a half years old, only 50,000 documents have been translated and fully exploited. Few of those translated documents have been circulated to policymakers in the Bush administration. And although one of the translated documents was leaked to the *New York Times* last summer, none of the others has been released, formally or informally.

The result: Much of today's debate about the threat posed three years ago by Saddam Hussein's Iraq is based on past assessments by U.S. intelligence agencies that we now know had no real sources on the ground in Iraq. The Bush administration seems remarkably uninterested in discovering, now that we have reams of material from Saddam's regime, what the actual terror-related and WMD-related activities of that regime were. But as the political debate of recent weeks makes clear, answering these questions remains central to the debate over the war. More important, it cannot be the case that there's nothing helpful to the ongoing war on terror in these files.

Beginning in February 2005, I started asking the Pentagon's public affairs office for more information on the document exploitation (DOCEX) project headquartered in Doha, Qatar. Later in the spring, I provided to the Pentagon a list of more than 40 unclassified Iraqi regime documents and requested that they be released. Pentagon public affairs officials denied this request and indicated that a Freedom of Information Act request would likely be the only way to secure the documents, even though they were not classified. I filed a FOIA request on June 19. The FOIA request was passed from the Pentagon to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to the

Stephen F. Hayes is a senior writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Army's Intelligence and Security Command. I received an "administrative denial" of my request on September 20.

One of the reasons I was given to explain the delays: "There are hundreds of thousands of other documents in the system, and it is a labor intensive process to find specific documents." That is nonsense, according to two intelligence sources with extensive background in the document exploitation project. The databases are keyword searchable.

Still, in an effort to make the searches easier, I provided the Pentagon with a new, more specific request for documents on November 21. The new request included document titles, short descriptions, dates, and even document numbers. This information came from a list I obtained with short summaries of a number of the documents in Doha. It bears noting that some of the documents described in the list have been flagged as potentially inauthentic. However, none of the documents I requested from the Pentagon was so flagged, and one analyst familiar with the document exploitation project said the government believes that at least 80 percent of the documents that have been processed are authentic.

Some of the documents that made up my most recent request sound unexceptional:

> TITLE: *Location of Weapons/Ammunition Storage with Map*
> SHORT DESCRIPTION: *Letter saying that compound wall needs to be built higher so that new houses being built won't be able to look over into secret military base.*
> AGENCY: *DIA*
> DOCUMENT DATE: *May-01*
> DOCUMENT #: *CMPC-2003-000788*

> TITLE: *IIS* [Iraqi Intelligence Service] *Request to move Persons, Prisoners, and VIPs to Private Residences*
> SHORT DESCRIPTION: *Preparations for attack. Preparations to move docs to private residences of agency workers.*
> AGENCY: *DIA*
> DOCUMENT DATE: *DEC-02*
> DOCUMENT #: *IZSP-2003-00300934*

The descriptions of other documents are more provocative:

> TITLE: *Intelligence coded memo by two IIS officers containing info on various topics; weapons boat, Palestinians training in Iraq, etc.*
> SHORT DESCRIPTION: *Lists Palestinians trained in Iraq, etc.*
> AGENCY: *DIA*
> DOCUMENT DATE: *Mar-02*
> DOCUMENT #: *IISP-2003-00038100*

> TITLE: *Presidential instruction from Hussein concerning mass graves in southern Iraq, and how to handle the PR/media fallout.*
> SHORT DESCRIPTION: *Concerning mass graves found in the south: Check for nuclear radiation, identify bodies, ensure that CNN is the first news agency onsite. Any funerals should have an international impact. Signed by Hussein.*
> AGENCY: *DIA*
> DOCUMENT DATE: *Feb-01*
> DOCUMENT #: *ISGZ-2004-00224003*

Presumably, this was a plan to blame any mass graves on deaths supposedly caused by depleted-uranium artillery shells used by U.S. forces in the first Gulf War—a favorite talking point of the pro-Saddam left in the 1990s.

Other document descriptions raise more questions than they answer:

> TITLE: *Chemical, Biological Agent Destruction*
> SHORT DESCRIPTION: *See Document for Remarks.*
> AGENCY: *DIA*
> DOCUMENT DATE: *Feb-03*
> DOCUMENT #: *BIAP-2003-004427*

> TITLE: *IIS Correspondence for the Iraq Embassy in the Philippines and Iraqi MFA* [Ministry of Foreign Affairs].
> SHORT DESCRIPTION: *Various correspondence e.g. visa forms, trade delegations, full reports on the connections between Abu Sayaf and the Qadafi Charity Establishment. Report on a certain individual traveling to Pakistan and involvements with bin Laden.*
> AGENCY: *DIA*
> DOCUMENT DATE: *Mar-01*
> DOCUMENT #: *ISGP-2003-00014100*

Were biological and chemical agents destroyed by the Iraqi regime? When? How? How many? Does the correspondence between the Iraqi Embassy in Manila and the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs shed any new light on the $25 million ransom that Muammar Qaddafi paid Abu Sayyaf in the summer of 2000, ostensibly to secure the release of 25 Westerners held hostage by the Filipino al Qaeda affiliate? Who traveled to Pakistan? What was his involvement with bin Laden? Did he have anything to do with the Iraqi government?

One would think the U.S. government would want answers to questions like these. But the DIA has been angling since last spring to close the DOCEX program in Doha. According to two Pentagon sources with direct knowledge of the issue, the future of that DOCEX program has been the subject of intense debate in recent weeks. Analysts with knowledge of the project say that the work is not close to being completed and warn that the closure of the DOCEX project there could mean the premature end to an important effort.

Although there are other facilities doing similar work in Baghdad and suburban Washington, the effort in Qatar is the most robust, with approximately 700 translators working in three shifts to review materials. (In a November 21 article in these pages—"Where Are the Pentagon Papers?"—I mistakenly reported that the Qatar effort employed some 200 translators. In fact, there are three shifts, each using 200-plus translators.)

Asked whether the program is on the verge of elimination, a spokesman for the DIA says that the Qatar DOCEX program is like any other program, in that it is subject to annual reviews and may always be defunded from one year to the next.

If anything, given the stakes in Iraq and the potential trove of useful information captured in postwar Iraq, one might expect the Bush administration to allocate additional resources to these document exploitation efforts. Instead they are about to be closed down. Why? ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Slow Pearl Harbor

Some foreign policy disasters are a long time in the making. BY JAMES JOHNSON AND ROBERT ZARATE

SIXTY-FOUR YEARS AGO, Japan stunned our nation with a daring raid on Pearl Harbor, killing 2,400 Americans and crippling the Pacific fleet. That same day, Japan also attacked U.S. forces in Manila, Midway and Wake Islands, and Guam, as well as British forces throughout East Asia. American leaders had anticipated attacks on the latter targets, but not on Pearl Harbor.

In the years following, fierce debates raged—in congressional hearings and among historians—over how the United States could have been so completely surprised. But it was not until the publication of *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, historian Roberta Morgan Wohlstetter's 1962 Bancroft Prize-winning study, that the dimensions of this national tragedy came to be fully understood.

Through her painstaking review of the events and decisions preceding Pearl Harbor, Wohlstetter found that the United States had failed to foresee the attack "not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones." That is, decision-makers and intelligence analysts—the latter of whom were then decentralized and dispersed among the military services—collectively failed to distinguish the small, faint signals warning of military disaster from the larger, louder mass of background noise suggesting anything but.

Only in retrospect, Wohlstetter stressed, did the warning signals become obvious and discernible. "Signals that are characterized today as absolutely unequivocal warnings of surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor become, on analysis in the context of December 1941, not merely ambiguous but occasionally inconsistent with such an attack," she wrote. "Indeed, at the time there was a good deal of evidence available to support all the wrong interpretations of last-minute signals, and the interpretations appeared wrong only after the event."

This perennial problem of intelligence analysis—of finding and pulling actionable warning signals from the vast morass of irrelevant background noise—is now known as "the Roberta Wohlstetter problem." The 9/11 attacks renewed public awareness of this problem. Indeed, Wohlstetter's study was referenced by, and served as an intellectual model for, the 9/11 Commission's final report.

But another problem that concerned her deeply has received less attention—namely, what she termed "slow Pearl Harbors." Wohlstetter developed this concept in a 1979 essay in the *Washington Quarterly*, "The Pleasures of Self-Deception," and in a later, unpublished manuscript. Unlike the dramatic surprises of December 7, 1941, and September 11, 2001, slow Pearl Harbors unfold when "the change at any given time seems innocent enough," but, over time, "the changes add up and can ultimately spell disaster." Here, she elaborated, "the problem is that after each small change even hindsight is not very clear. In fact, one can sometimes argue interminably even about the cumulative disaster."

Wohlstetter saw a slow Pearl Harbor in Britain's reluctance during the 1930s to recognize that Nazi Germany was using arms control agreements not to avoid what Hitler had called "an unlimited arms race," but to slow Britain's rearmament while using ambiguous violations of these agreements to accelerate its own.

Today, the problems posed by nuclear proliferation may be best understood as potential slow Pearl Harbors. Despite prolonged negotiations in the 1990s—in particular, the establishment of the Agreed Framework in 1994—North Korea successfully used a series of ambiguous violations to test American, Western, and international resolve while accumulating plutonium for several nuclear explosives. Lingering uncertainty about North Korea's intentions dissipated in 2003, when Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and declared its possession of nuclear weapons.

In 2003, Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, became aware of undeclared Iranian nuclear activities. But today Iran—claiming an intention to comply with IAEA safeguards while nevertheless reasserting its "inalienable right" to practically any nuclear activity short of inserting fissile material into a nuclear explosive's core—is repeatedly testing American, Western, and international resolve.

Last week, ElBaradei agreed with Western assessments that, once Iran's underground uranium enrichment complex at Natanz resumes operation, Iran will be within "a few months" of building a nuclear explosive. Still, he warned against attempts to use non-diplomatic—yet less-than-military—responses to Iranian intransigence. Such responses, the Nobel Peace laureate claimed, would "open a Pandora's box. There would be efforts to isolate Iran; Iran would retaliate; and at the end of the day you have to go back to the negotiating table to find the solution."

But to deal with potential slow Pearl Harbors, Wohlstetter stressed, we must prepare proportional but firm responses to such less dramatic—but nonetheless serious—develop-

James Johnson and Robert Zarate are writing a biography of the strategist Albert Wohlstetter, Roberta Wohlstetter's late husband.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments. "Our own counter-strategy first of all must be to take these small changes seriously, even when they seem trivial," she explained. "It is important to make proportionate counter-moves, sometimes to offset the opponent's gains, or to induce him to withdraw."

"There are always a multitude of reasons for turning a blind eye to infractions," she cautioned, "but one essential that runs through many examples is the desire to keep an existing agreement intact, or to keep relations calm, if not actually pleasant, in order to write a new agreement."

If nothing else, Roberta Wohlstetter's writings on Pearl Harbor and "slow Pearl Harbors" should remind us that, in using negotiations as a means to the end of disarming nascent nuclear-armed nations, or preventing nations from building nuclear explosives, we should be careful not to give up our end in order to obtain our means. For disasters, both foreseeable and unforeseeable, may follow. ♦



The Dictator and the Congressman

Bill Delahunt of Massachusetts warms up to Venezuela's strongman. BY DUNCAN CURRIE

IF THE SAHARA DESERT went Marxist, ran a Cold War-era joke, pretty soon it would have to import sand. Today the gag might be: If Venezuela, the world's fifth-largest oil exporter, elected Hugo Chávez, pretty soon it would have to import petroleum. Except it's not a gag. In December 2002, less than four years into Chávez's presidency, Venezuelans began importing oil. The wells hadn't gone dry. Rather, the state petroleum firm, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), which was then controlled by the opposition, had called a general strike to protest Chávez's increasingly autocratic rule.

Chávez balked at their demands—that he either call a free election or resign—and instead fired some 12,000 of the company's 38,000 workers. He emerged from the fracas with absolute power over PDVSA, though at the time that didn't seem like much to wish for. Venezuela's oil industry—along with its broader economy—had been crippled by the strike, which came just months after an abortive coup failed to dislodge Chávez. One expert predicted the country had lost the equivalent of 400,000 barrels per day. Since then, of course, global prices have skyrocketed—and Chávez has made out like a bandit. It's no exaggeration to say that petroleum is the lifeblood of his "Bolivarian Revolution."

Indeed, to the extent that America and the world take notice of Chávez, it's almost entirely a function of his oil wealth. The thuggish Venezuelan leftist, a former army colonel, has been spending cash in the Western Hemisphere like a drunken sailor; and the chief beneficiary of this largesse has been Fidel Castro's Cuba. "If he didn't have that money behind him," says GOP congressman Connie Mack IV, a Chávez critic, "I don't think people would take him as seriously."

Would Bill Delahunt? The Massachusetts congressman, a Democrat, recently brokered an oil contract with Chávez worth some $9 million. Under the terms of the deal—which grew out of a Delahunt-Chávez meeting in Caracas last August—a Houston-based PDVSA subsidiary, CITGO, will send 12 million gallons of cheap home-heating fuel to various charities and more than 40,000 lower-income Bay Staters this winter. About three quarters of the oil will go directly to poor families; the rest will go to local organizations serving the needy.

Delahunt was cock-a-hoop over the agreement, which he trumpeted as a token of Chávez's concern for the indigent. He denied it had a political context. "It was about people," he told the *Boston Globe*. "It was genuinely humanitarian in its intention and in its impact." That's not how the Bush administration saw it. Here was a lone congressman playing freelance diplomat and allowing a stridently anti-American—and antidemocratic—bully to score propaganda points. But Delahunt didn't seem to mind. "I don't work for Condoleezza Rice," he told the *Globe*. "I don't report to the State Department. I report to the people who elected me in the state of Massachusetts. I belong to an independent branch of government."

No doubt folks in his Quincy-area district will be delighted to get dis-

Duncan Currie is a reporter at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

counted fuel this winter. Take Linda and Paul Kelly, the Quincy couple in whose front yard the contract was signed at a press conference on November 22. "Just because [Chávez] has problems with President Bush, that's not going to affect me," Mrs. Kelly explained to the *Globe*. "My political views aren't going to keep me warm. I know people keep talking about this, but it's a gesture that someone wanted to make and give to me, and it's going to help lots of people, not just me."

In case the Kellys and their neighbors forget who's supplying the low-cost oil, the Venezuelan government took out a full-page ad in several U.S. newspapers to remind them. "How Venezuela is keeping the home fires burning in Massachusetts," it blared. Fair enough. But who will keep the home fires burning in Venezuela? The irony of the Delahunt-Chávez deal, as former ExxonMobil executive and Tufts professor Bruce Everett has pointed out, is that nearly half of all Venezuelans live in abject poverty. Yet Chávez has "taken money belonging to these desperately poor people to give to Mr. Delahunt's constituents"—who, by the way, reside in one of America's richest states.

The deal might not have gone through absent the work of Joseph P. Kennedy II, son of Robert F. Kennedy and a former Democratic congressman, as well as chairman of the Boston-based Citizens Energy Corp. Along with the Massachusetts Energy Consumers Alliance, Citizens now has the task of distributing the Venezuelan oil. When company officials inked the contract with PDVSA in the Kellys' front yard, Delahunt seized the moment to blast Big Oil for not cutting costs. "With temperatures dropping and oil prices soaring, we're all worried sick about people without the means to heat their homes," he said. "It is gratifying that at least one major oil company is willing to step up."

It's the kind of plaudit Hugo Chávez craves: the image of Venezuela, spurred by his creed of "21st-century socialism," riding gallantly to the rescue of poor Americans whose own private oil firms can't be bothered to lift a finger. "Delahunt allowed himself to be used," says veteran Latin America hand Otto Reich, who served under both Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. "It's a very smart political act" by Chávez.

Delahunt has in past years emerged as a leading Democratic voice on Western Hemisphere issues. Though he's been more supportive than many House Democrats of military aid for the pro-American Uribe government in Colombia, he tacks decidedly leftward on Cuba and Venezuela: opposing the embargo and calling for détente with Chávez. "He's given Chávez a lot of cover in the U.S. Congress," Reich says, noting that Delahunt has defended the maverick Venezuelan populist and called for rethinking George W. Bush's South America policy. According to a Delahunt aide, the recent U.S.-Venezuela dialogue "has been disrespectful in *both* directions."

The Quincy native speaks for a cluster of Democrats, and even a few Republicans, who say Chávez deserves more "respect" than he's gotten from the current administration. That group includes New York congressman José Serrano, a longtime Castro apologist and Chávez booster who—by no coincidence—has also secured cheap Venezuelan oil for his constituents. CITGO is now providing some 8 million gallons of home-heating fuel to nonprofit housing agencies in the Bronx.

One can't help wondering if Chávez is wasting his petrodollars. No matter how much underpriced oil he pumps into Boston, New York, and Chicago, he cannot gloss over his abysmal history of squelching civil liberties, packing the Venezuelan courts, trampling the constitution, and using the army to suppress dissent. Then there's his record abroad. In concert with Castro and other rogues, he's tried his hand at subverting the region's pro-American democracies, such as Uribe's Colombia. Chávez dreams of leading a Latin American unity project. He claims as his inspiration Simón Bolívar, the 19th-century freedom fighter. But given Chávez's chummy alliance with Castro, U.S. policymakers worry that, in spirit, his model may be Che Guevara.

There was plenty of Che paraphernalia outside the recent Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, Argentina, where Chávez railed against hemispheric free trade pacts and led a ferocious anti-Bush rally. He has called the U.S. president a "killer," an "assassin," a "madman," a "crazy man," and, more jauntily, "Mr. Danger." He frequently warns of a pending American invasion of Venezuela. Last January, after Condoleezza Rice gently rebuked Chávez during her confirmation hearings for secretary of state, the ex-paratrooper fired back. Rice was merely upset, Chávez said on his weekly TV show, because he—Chávez—wouldn't sleep with her. She was also "a true illiterate."

Such loutish bluster, says Latin America specialist Mark Falcoff, has made Chávez something of a laughingstock in the region. According to Falcoff, serious Latin American leaders—even those on the left—privately dismiss him as a "clown." "He can't control his big mouth," says Falcoff. "That denigrates his prestige." With the exception of Cuba and Bolivia—where Marxist coca-grower Eva Morales appears poised to win the presidency later this month—Chávez exercises scant influence. None of the region's cultural and economic giants—Mexico, Chile, Brazil—seems keen on playing a subordinate role in Chávez's Latin-unity venture.

The crucial variable in Venezuela is still oil. As Falcoff notes, Chávez has done a terrible job of managing the petroleum industry through PDVSA. He's merely lucked out with the abnormally high oil prices. Three to five years down the road, if the cost of petroleum ebbs, Falcoff predicts Chávez will be terribly unpopular in Venezuela—as he was pre-9/11, before the oil market took off. But then, as Reich asks, "Who knows if the price of oil is going to go down? What if it doubles?" In that case, expect more U.S. congressmen to travel to Caracas with their hands out. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Read Pamuk's Novels

They're smarter about Turkey and Europe than his political pronouncements. BY BART J. SPRUYT

THE FAMOUS Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk has not (yet) received the Nobel Prize for Literature, but he was honored this year with the most important literary prize in Germany, the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade. Pamuk accepted the prize in Frankfurt in October with an acceptance speech that was itself a little masterpiece—and one that bears examining in light both of the controversy over whether Turkey should be admitted to the European Union, and of Pamuk's own prosecution by the government in Ankara.

The novel, Pamuk says, is "one of the greatest artistic achievements to come out of Europe . . . one of the cornerstones of European civilization." Indeed, the novel is "the means by which Europe has created and made visible its nature, if there is such a thing." To write and read novels, he argued, requires certain characteristic skills—of imagination and empathy—that are also necessary in social and political life. Author and reader must "liberate" themselves "from the confines" of their own personae. "The history of the novel is the history of human liberation: By putting ourselves in others' shoes, by using our imaginations to free ourselves from our own identities, we are able to set ourselves free."

But this liberation is not without danger. It involves disclosing the "whispered secrets" of shame, pride, anger, and humiliation. And he who unveils "life's hidden geometry" may cause his fellow citizens unease. Citizens prefer to conceal certain truths. "Novels," Pamuk contends, "give voice not just to a nation's pride and joy, but also to its anger, its vulnerabilities, and its shame. It is because they remind readers of their shame . . . that novelists still arouse such anger . . . that we still see books burned, and novelists prosecuted."

Pamuk teaches that the skills honed in reading and writing novels underlie the European ideals of enlightenment, equality, and democracy. But "certain politicians" in Europe, nationalistic and narrow-minded Christians, have departed from those ideals, in their anti-Turkish sentiments and their harsh opposition to Turkey's E.U. membership. In so doing, they have only increased the "silent shame" among Turks, fearful of rejection. Turkish nationalists—again described by Pamuk in vague terms as "certain politicians in my own country"—cunningly take advantage of these feelings of frustration to stoke anti-Western sentiments. And so Turkey and Europe face the same choice: between "peace and nationalism," between the imagination of the writer and "the sort of nationalism that condones burning his books."

Pamuk speaks with authority about the relationship between East and West. It is the most important theme of his scintillating body of work. And he certainly has come into heavy-handed contact with the dark side of the Turkish state. The Turkish secular establishment is increasingly nervous about Pamuk's lack of respect for the state ideology. He blames the Turkish state for being narrow-mindedly nationalistic, denounces the jailing of writers, and openly criticizes the government and army for deciding to deal with Kurdish separatism by force alone. When Ankara in December 1998 sought to coopt Pamuk by offering him the dignity of becoming an "artist of the state," Pamuk declined.

This past summer, Pamuk told a German journalist that he had been advised to watch his words. But it was already too late. In a February 2005 interview with the Swiss *Tages-Anzeiger*, Pamuk deplored the "more than 30,000 Kurds and one million Armenians" who were killed in Turkey. "Nobody dares to say so. That's why I do it. And that's why they hate me." Protests and book burnings followed. A complaint was brought against Pamuk under Article 301 of the criminal code, which prohibits publicly denigrating Turkey. On December 16, Pamuk is due in court. A four-year prison sentence is a distinct possibility.

Pamuk is indisputably right about "certain nationalistic politicians" in his country. They evidently do not appreciate the public revelation of "life's hidden geometry." But is Pamuk equally justified in criticizing European politicians who oppose Turkey's entry into the E.U.? All he has to say about them is that they lack the imagination and empathy of the writer, and for that reason continue to paint Turkey as a dangerous "other."

Opponents of Turkish entry (who are, incidentally, supported by a large majority of E.U. citizens) not only believe that a non-European country with a completely different culture and only the most shaky beginnings of liberal democracy is ill-suited for E.U. membership. The absorption of a large country like Turkey (with a young and growing population) would also lead to a dramatic shift of power within the E.U., radically advancing the Islamization of Europe. The geopolitical argu-

Bart J. Spruyt leads the Edmund Burke Stichting, a Dutch conservative think tank. The text of Pamuk's speech is available at www.nrc.nl/redactie/Doc/pamuk.doc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment, much beloved of American conservatives (Turkey has been a valued member of NATO since 1952), seems weak in comparison. Arab leaders lately have become more and more positive about Turkey's accession, not only because the present Turkish government is explicitly Islamic, but also because they see strategic advantages in a European Union with Turkey among its most prominent members. They, reasonably, expect the new E.U. to counterbalance U.S. power. It is hardly a failure of imagination to wonder: What if Turkey Islamicizes Europe rather than E.U. membership westernizing Turkey?

In his Frankfurt acceptance speech, Pamuk rightly said that the East-West question is really all about the tension between tradition and modernity. These tensions have not been resolved within Europe either. European secularists, for their part, fear Turkish entry because its culture and therefore politics has clearly not progressed as far as Europe has. Secularism has been imposed on Turkish society by the army, but Islam there is as lively as ever. European conservatives on the other hand are concerned that Turkey's entry, and especially the ideology of post-Christian individualism justifying this entry, will further weaken European identity. In their view, Europe should stay far away from becoming the continent envisaged by Pamuk and his postmodern followers: a continent that is to have, like Turkey, "two souls." Pamuk holds out this double identity as the "shared future" of Europe and Turkey. To that end, "Europe has to reinvent itself as a more democratic, multireligious society," based upon a "tolerant, antinationalistic vision"—that is, upon the imagination and the empathy of the readers and writers of novels.

In order to realize this shared future, Turkey, of course, must change as well: It must modernize, learn to tolerate its minorities, liberate itself of the persona suppressing its "whispered secrets." But Pamuk himself has spoken about the "essentially non-Western" nature of his country. Turkey is "geographically" a part of Europe, Pamuk said in an interview with *Time*, but "politically" it is not. The conflict between Western and Islamic values is the source of a continuous confusion about its own identity. And Pamuk the novelist is at odds with Pamuk the political commentator: His novels make abundantly clear that modernization is never a smooth process.

In *My Name is Red* (1998), a novel about Ottoman miniaturists from the 16th century, Pamuk describes the complexity of the tensions between tradition and modernity with unprecedented precision. Should the miniaturists, in obedience to the Koran, remain faithful to the art of painting of the old Persian masters, or should they be allowed to paint according to the new rules of European art, with its realistic perspective and freedom for individual creativity? Those who choose the European way not only put their own art but also their whole tradition and culture at risk. The "Venetian" perspective flattens everything, placing the high and the low on the same level—and thus does not offer a view of the world as seen by God. At the same time, the miniaturists realize that a continuation of their tradition is no longer possible. And so the book comes to a dead end. The miniaturists cannot stop and cannot go on. The painter who is so disconcerted by all innovations that he joins a sect to escape into the past, meets his death. But the court official who founds a secret studio in order to have the Sultan painted according to Venetian rules is also killed. And the murderer who wants to paint his own portrait at the end of the novel can only come to the conclusion that his painting is a monumental failure. Tradition is no longer a possibility; modernity is inaccessible.

"One day I read a book and my whole life changed": the unforgettable opening sentence of *The New Life* (1994). But the group of Turkish people who fall under the spell of this book meet their death. Those who turn on the book to salvage the values of old Turkey fall prey to fundamentalism.

In his acceptance speech in Frankfurt, Pamuk said wonderful things about the novel. His own novels, in contrast, eloquently argue that modern Turkey does not have the characteristic skills needed to read imaginatively. Young Turks do not make good novel readers.

Yes, the writer is wiser than the public intellectual. Where the artist Pamuk ends in deadlock, the public man encourages political adventures. The author in him knows that this adventure will lead to enormous difficulties, with an uncertain outcome. To put it another way: The novelist Pamuk is a conservative, the intellectual Pamuk a liberal. Is it possible to fundamentally change a country whose identity is determined by a specific religion solely through conversations, political deals, treaties—can politics change culture? In general, liberals will tend to affirm this proposition while conservatives will have some doubt. This, in the end, is the core conflict between the supporters and opponents of Turkish entry, one of the great questions of contemporary European politics.

If conservative doubts about the plausibility of forging a new cultural identity through politics prove to be correct, the consequences of Turkey's admission to the E.U. would be disastrous: for Europe, for the West, and for the United States. The argument of the "no" camp is not determined by narrow-minded, anti-Islamic nationalism, but by respect for the complexity of reality, including "life's hidden geometry," and by an understanding of the permanence of the tension between tradition and modernity. It has little to do with fear of the unknown. With Pericles, European conservatives merely affirm that "for us more is at stake than for those who do not enjoy these [democratic] prerogatives in the same measure." ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One China, One Taiwan

Bush's democracy-promotion doctrine doesn't square with his China policy. BY ELLEN BORK

DURING HIS RECENT TRIP to Japan, South Korea, China, and Mongolia, President Bush extolled the region's wave of democratization as "one of the greatest stories in human history" and lamented the holdouts who are "out of step with their neighbors and isolated from the world." The president also made it clear that democratic Taiwan, though itself isolated internationally, is as important to the United States as Japan and South Korea. He pointedly held Taiwan out to China as an example of a "free and democratic Chinese society."

Ellen Bork writes frequently about Asia for THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

Such praise of Taiwan—delivered in Kyoto shortly before the president arrived in Beijing—contrasts sharply with Bush's humiliating rebuff to Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian in 2003. Partly as a result, Bush's trip to Asia has been interpreted as a turning point, marking the application to Asia of the Bush Doctrine of U.S. support for democracy. This attractive notion, however, is complicated by one essential fact: The Bush Doctrine is incompatible with America's one-China policy, which holds that Taiwan is a part of "one China" and that there should be a peaceful resolution of the dispute between Beijing and Taipei. More recently, the Bush administration has added the demand that neither side change "the status quo."

When Taiwan held its first democratic presidential election in 1996, it was praised internationally as the first "Chinese democracy." And indeed, Taiwan's people are overwhelmingly ethnic Chinese. Nevertheless, many, perhaps the majority, of Taiwan's citizens would choose other words to describe their achievement. More and more of them view themselves as Taiwanese, or as both Taiwanese and Chinese. Fewer and fewer consider themselves exclusively Chinese.

Several things explain this, starting with history. Taiwan has not been governed from Beijing since the end of the 19th century, when Japan took control of the island after the Sino-Japanese war. After World War II, Taiwan's people hoped they might be liberated, but instead Taiwan was placed in a trusteeship under Chiang Kai-shek, whose Kuomintang (KMT) movement had fought a civil war on the mainland with the Communists led by Mao Zedong.

When Chiang fled from China to

INTRODUCING...

WorldwideStandard.com

The Weekly Standard Foreign Policy Posts

A new foreign policy blog available only at weeklystandard.com

A forceful John Bolton speech at the UN? An anti-U.S. harangue by Hugo Chavez? A change at the top at DOD? A Senate hearing on military strategy?

The Worldwide Standard, edited by online foreign editor Daniel McKivergan, features posts on events and ideas of significance to American foreign policy.

Bill Kristol and the rest of the *Weekly Standard* team will keep an eye on breaking news—and on media distortions. Visit early or late. We'll be keeping watch.

Bookmark The Worldwide Standard at www.weeklystandard.com/worldwidestandard and read the whole thing.

WorldwideStandard.com

Our jurisdiction is the world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Taiwan in 1949, his Kuomintang dictatorship empowered the small minority of newcomers over the island's existing population—often referred to as ethnic Taiwanese, though their forebears emigrated from the mainland centuries before. Eighty-four percent of Taiwan's 23 million people are descended from these immigrants, while 14 percent are descended from the more recent arrivals. As one scholar has pointed out, Taiwan not only experienced 100 years of development outside mainland control, it also missed "key events that shaped the national consciousness of the Chinese," including the collapse of imperial rule in the early 20th century, the civil war at midcentury, and the imposition of communism, with all the ensuing upheavals. Taiwan's people have never been ruled by the People's Republic of China.

When Chen Shui-bian and his Democratic Progressive party, the longtime opposition to the KMT, are accused of stoking Taiwanese identity for electoral gain, it must be remembered that, for decades, the KMT dictatorship repressed the Taiwanese and engaged in a program of Sinification, which included not only suppression of the Taiwanese language and culture but also the actual massacre of thousands in 1947 and almost 40 years of martial law. Only after martial law ended in 1987 and liberalization began in earnest in the 1990s have the Taiwanese been free to discuss their history, and Taiwanese intellectuals to compensate for what one of them calls Taiwan's "peripheralization," or relegation to footnote status in the history of grander subjects.

Contrary to a common misperception abroad, the recent development of Taiwanese identity is neither the product of pro-independence activism, nor a phenomenon confined to ethnic Taiwanese. Both the traditionally pro-unification Kuomintang and the traditionally pro-independence Democratic People's party agree that Taiwanese identity encompasses both ethnic Taiwanese and mainlanders. "These politicians did not invent this identity," writes Stanford University scholar Melissa J. Brown, author of *Is Taiwan Chinese?* "They merely articulated and emphasized a change in Taiwanese identity that had been developing" during the decade of democratization beginning in the mid-1990s.

A trend is clear. According to a poll by the National Chengchi University in 2004, 41 percent of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese in 2004, up from just 17 percent in 1993. In the same period, the share who called themselves Chinese fell by more than half, to under 10 percent.

The devastating losses by the Democratic Progressive party in the December 3 municipal elections have fanned speculation that KMT leader and Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou will be a formidable candidate in the next presidential election, in 2008, tipping Taiwan's China policy back toward the KMT's traditional reunification position. Perhaps so, but it is too soon to tell. Ma's own career owes much to his association with the "new Taiwanese" identity. At a rally during the 1998 mayoral campaign in which Ma beat Chen Shui-bian, President Lee Teng-hui asked Ma in Mandarin, the language of mainlanders, whether he was a mainlander or a Taiwanese. Ma famously responded in Taiwanese that he was a "new Taiwanese," a sure sign that he recognizes the power of that identity among his constituents. In fact, after his party's recent electoral triumph, Ma quickly disavowed the notion that his victory reflected "the people's stronger inclination toward the mainland," adding, "I do not see it that way."

To be sure, the question of identity is complicated. It can be difficult to know what anyone means by "Taiwanese" or "Chinese." The American expert on Taiwan Shelley Rigger argues that discussions of Taiwanese identity often conflate several distinct issues, such as people's origins (Taiwan or mainland) and citizenship, neither of which is a reliable gauge of opinions on unification or independence. On that matter, views appear pragmatic, and conditioned upon other things, such as people's sense of security, the state of the economy, and political developments. However, Rigger writes, "the absence of consensus on nationality does not spark a crisis, because there is a consensus about the process by which decisions should be made: democracy. . . . [T]heir commitment to democracy is stronger than their determination to achieve a particular outcome."

The same cannot be said of the U.S. government. Washington's official "one China" policy is not rooted in democracy or self-determination. Conceived during the Cold War, U.S. policy has remained mostly static and hamstrung by anachronistic views of China and Taiwan. Washington has tried to soften the edges of Chinese demands without questioning their legitimacy. U.S. policy reflects neither the dramatic changes in Taiwan nor China's economic and military growth and petrified political system.

As a result, U.S. policy treats Taiwan as an abstraction. American officials resist as provocative all assertions of a Taiwanese identity, including revisions to the constitution, referenda, and other normal prerogatives of a democratic nation. This state of affairs is both unsustainable and at odds with the Bush Doctrine.

Even the president's attempt to mitigate the imperatives of his own policy—by arguing that democracy in Asia typically follows economic development—fails to bridge the gap between the one-China policy and this administration's pro-democracy doctrine. Taiwan has achieved both democracy and economic development, while China's growing wealth only makes its drive to take Taiwan by undemocratic means more feasible.

A president who speaks so stirringly about freedom for victims of Arab dictatorships must consider the implications of Taiwan's democracy for U.S. policy. Precisely because of the achievement the president praised so fulsomely, Taiwanese increasingly feel both separate from the mainland and committed to a democratic society. Until U.S. policy toward Taiwan reflects that fact, the Bush Doctrine cannot be applied to one of the greatest foreign policy challenges the United States will face in the coming years. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fighting to Win

With the proper strategy, victory in Iraq is far more likely than people think

By Frederick W. Kagan

Is retreat from—or withdrawal from—or defeat in—Iraq inevitable? Almost all opponents of the Bush administration say it is. As Rep. Jack Murtha put it in mid-November, when demanding the "immediate redeployment of U.S. troops" consistent with their safety, "The United States cannot accomplish anything further in Iraq militarily. It is time to bring the troops home." This was echoed more recently by Democratic chief Howard Dean: "The idea that we're going to win this war is an idea that, unfortunately, is just plain wrong." Advocates of withdrawal point to continuing attacks on coalition and Iraqi targets and to the steady, somber flow of U.S. casualties, as well as the increasing fear that our Army will break under the strain of prolonged occupation.

Administration supporters of course share these concerns, and some seem (privately) to share the view that the war may be unwinnable. Even a few inside the administration may have their doubts. In any case, the administration clearly believes that it has to promise a significant reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq—"conditions permitting"—in 2006. Reports are circulating that preparations for troop reductions have already begun.

The irony is that demands for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces do not spring from any particular recent bad news from Iraq (there has been little) or justified alarm about the Army's ability to sustain itself (high levels of retention continue to make up for problems with recruitment). On the contrary, the most recent news from Iraq is promising. American strategy has improved, and prospects for success are better than they have ever been.

Since early September, coalition efforts along the Syrian border to clear towns of insurgents have not generated anger, violence, and outbursts—on the contrary. The clearing of Tal Afar in mid-September by a combined American and Iraqi force followed a request by the citizens of that town for an American intervention. Operations in villages in the upper Euphrates since then have generated limited and sporadic resistance, mainly from cornered insurgents. The lessons of the October referendum are very clear, moreover: Dramatic and aggressive joint action by U.S. and Iraqi forces to preempt and defeat the insurgents' attempt to derail the election worked spectacularly well.

There is at this point at least as much evidence that the aggressive use of coalition forces is effective as there is that the presence of those forces is—as U.S. critics insist—harmful. Desirable though the withdrawal of U.S. forces is from both the American and the Iraqi perspectives, therefore, it must not be the first goal of U.S. operations in Iraq. The truth is that calls for a precipitous retreat from Iraq, or for setting arbitrary deadlines or milestones for withdrawal, now threaten to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

A Baseless Urgency

The urgency of an American withdrawal from Iraq is no greater now than it has been for some time, and those most loudly demanding immediate withdrawal have no convincing evidence to support their demands. In his passionate speech, Murtha quoted selectively from the statements of CENTCOM officials to present a picture of Iraq in which resentment of U.S. forces appeared to be growing and to be deepening the insurgency. "I have concluded," said Murtha, "the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is impeding this progress. Our troops have become the primary target of the insurgency. They are united against U.S. forces, and we have become a catalyst for violence. U.S. troops are the common enemy of the Sunnis, the Saddamists, and the foreign jihadists." In response to questions, he repeated: "It's time to bring [U.S. troops] home. . . . They're the targets. They have become the enemy! . . . We're uniting the enemy against us!"

But these assertions are simply wrong.

Coalition forces have always been the primary targets of the insurgents, but over the past year Iraqi security forces and Iraqi civilians have borne a larger share of insurgent attacks than they did before the first battle of Falluja and the revelation of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Recent spectacular attacks on Iraqi police and security forces and assassina-

Frederick W. Kagan, a military historian and coauthor of While America Sleeps, *is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. His "Blueprint for Victory" appeared in* The Weekly Standard *of October 31, 2005.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions of Sunni political leaders participating in the election underscore this point. Nor are the insurgents any more "united" than they have ever been. On the contrary, growing numbers of Sunni Arab leaders are joining the political process in defiance of the terrorists within their communities. It is even possible, according to recent news reports, that some Sunni Arab insurgent groups have put out feelers to the Iraqi government about the possibility of themselves joining the political process.

The reaction of Sunni Arabs to terrorist leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi's repeated calls in September for civil war against the Shiites was also significant. Although a handful of Sunni Arab clerics denounced Zarqawi for raising issues that distracted attention from the fight against the Americans, most kept silent, tacitly accepting the priority of the struggle against the Shiites. This silence does not necessarily bode well for civil order in Iraq, but it certainly suggests that the radical Sunni Arab clerics do not identify the American presence as the major problem they face. On the contrary, it is another argument for the importance of continued American involvement in this struggle in order to avert civil war.

Murtha and his allies, then, ignore the fact that, while the Americans are a common enemy of the insurgents, the Iraqi government is also a common enemy—and a much more threatening one for most of the rebel groups. The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is simply not the primary problem in that country, and the removal of those forces would therefore not end the insurgency.

Data about insurgent attacks in Iraq do not support any sense of urgency about withdrawing either. The October constitutional referendum saw significantly fewer attacks than the January 2005 elections: 299 attacks on January 30 generating 213 casualties, versus 89 attacks and 49 casualties on October 15. Insurgents attacked only 19 election sites in October; in January they struck 88. Although the significance of such data is not clear, and other trend lines are less promising than this, there is certainly no case to be made that the situation is worsening enough to support urgent demands for immediate withdrawal. On the contrary, it appears that significant progress is being made.

Another of the central arguments Murtha and others, including some CENTCOM leaders and Bush administration officials, have used to support a shrinking U.S. footprint in Iraq is that a reduction in American forces will "incentivize" the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own security. This argument would make sense if there were Iraqi military and security organs ready and able to take control of the fight against the insurgents, but there are not. James Fallows has recently described (in excessively dark terms, to be sure) the plight of the Iraqi army, and it is clear that the Iraqis cannot now control the insurgency by themselves. The preparation of Iraqi police forces has been lagging far behind that of the army, and it will be still longer until they are ready. More responsible advocates of withdrawal allow for the possibility of maintaining American support troops and contractors in Iraq to make up for the near-total inability of the Iraqi army to support itself. Murtha would remove even those (he declared: "Setting an exit-strategy with some kind of event-driven plan doesn't work because they always find an excuse not to get them out"), allowing the Iraqi military to crumble instantly, as it surely would. We cannot "incentivize" the Iraqis to take responsibility before they are ready to do so.

Nor do the Iraqis need much in the way of incentives. Evidence both statistical and anecdotal underlines the determination of the new Iraqi army to participate in the counterinsurgency on its own. Iraqi units have planned and conducted their own operations on numerous occasions, and in 2005 there have been no instances of Iraqi army units running from combat. U.S. officers repeatedly express pride in the Iraqi troops they are training and fighting with—and offer numerous stories to back up that pride. The Iraqis are fighting and will continue to fight without the "incentive" of being required to take on tasks for which they are unprepared.

Perhaps the most serious argument made by those who advocate reductions in the American presence in Iraq is that the U.S. Army is in danger of breaking. General Barry McCaffrey recently warned that the "wheels are coming off" the Armed Forces. Andrew Krepinevich accepted this assumption as one of the key bases for his argument that the United States should simultaneously reduce its forces in Iraq and adopt an "oil-spot" strategy of focusing on the security of a small number of key locations and spreading that control gradually over the country. We will return to the wisdom of the "oil-spot" approach momentarily, but we must first consider the assertion that the Army is in imminent danger of collapse.

It is difficult to measure, in truth, how close the Army is to "breaking." The bare numbers are not very revealing—the Army missed its annual recruiting goal last year by 7,000 soldiers (out of a recruiting target of 80,000 to support a force of over 500,000). The pipeline of "deferred accessions," those who have volunteered and been accepted but whose reporting to basic training units is delayed, on the other hand, has dried up, so that subsequent recruiting shortfalls may be effectively much higher. The Army appears to be having more difficulty in filling certain essential specialties than it has before, although units deploying to Iraq do so with full complements of soldiers on the whole.

The most worrisome aspect of the problem is that the Army is now relying on an extremely high retention and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reenlistment rate to make up for recruiting shortfalls—the more soldiers who "re-up," the fewer new recruits the Army has to find. McCaffrey, Krepinevich, and others worry that as the war goes on, retention will fall—and then the wheels really will come off. Students of the British war in Northern Ireland second these fears. Most U.S. soldiers have experienced only one or two deployments to Iraq, but retention in the British Army did not begin to suffer until soldiers went back for their third and fourth deployments.

The strain on the Army is no secret. The administration's consistent refusal—since taking office, since 9/11, since Afghanistan, and since Operation Iraqi Freedom—to increase the size of the active force continues to be both inexplicable and inexcusable. But no one knows when or even if the Army will break. No one, indeed, has any very clear idea of what "breaking" would mean today—the term refers to the Army of the post-Vietnam period, which was suffering not only from prolonged combat, but also from the effects of defeat in war, rejection by American society, and the sudden conversion of a draftee force to an all-volunteer force. It does not seem that the Army of today will face many of those challenges, so the validity of the analogy is suspect.

Neither is it clear that there is nothing to be done about this problem other than withdrawing from Iraq. The "broken" Army of the 1970s suffered from serious recruiting problems, which the Reagan administration fixed in short order by increasing recruiting bonuses, improving recruiting strategies, and adding a presidential call-to-arms. The Army has been feeling its way toward such solutions today, but cautiously and without the benefit of public, presidential, or significant financial assistance. It would be wise to try fixing the Army without giving up on Iraq before accepting defeat there as the price we must pay for the institutional health of the Army.

It is not clear, moreover, that the United States should prioritize the institutional health of the Army over success in Iraq. Withdrawing from Iraq prematurely would almost certainly lead to the collapse of civil order there, the failure of Iraqi democracy, the dramatic rise of al Qaeda and other forms of violent Islamic radicalism, and possibly the expansion of intra-Iraqi conflict to involve other countries of the region. It is likely that many of these scenarios would see American force reengaged in the region in large numbers and in short order. The terms of the conflict would then be worse, the stakes higher, and the dangers of "breaking" the Army even greater. So it is almost certainly the case that withdrawing from Iraq now to save the Army is as short-sighted as it initially seems to some to be wise and far-seeing. Those concerned about the health of the Army—to say nothing of the well-being of the nation—should give first priority to success in this mission.

In Search of a Strategy

Senator Joseph Biden recently declared, "If the administration shows it has a blueprint for protecting our fundamental security interests in Iraq, Americans will support it." He is quite right. One of the reasons for the decline in domestic support for the Bush administration's policy in Iraq has been the absence of any such clearly articulated strategy for victory there. CENTCOM has long argued that the key to success is a small American footprint and training Iraqi soldiers to take over as rapidly as possible. CENTCOM commander General John Abizaid has frequently stated that he believes the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is one of the major catalysts of the insurgency. President Bush has repeatedly declared that "as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." And so Murtha and others have faithfully repeated these proclamations in support of demands to withdraw.

But the hope of turning the problem over to the Iraqis is an exit strategy, not a strategy for success. We could, as Murtha points out, accomplish this goal tomorrow (or at least in six months), if we didn't care about what happened in Iraq the next day. The goal of winning in Iraq requires a much more complicated plan that does more than prepare the Iraqis to continue the fight, and until recently the administration had failed to present such a plan in any detail.

The recent release of a National Security Council strategy document, and recent speeches by the president, have only begun to fill this void. The document lays out the administration's general approach to the problem and rightly stresses the need to coordinate military, political, and economic activities. It does not explain how that coordination will occur, considering the fractured nature of command arrangements in Iraq. Even worse, it still does not explain clearly what role American forces must play in Iraq apart from training the Iraqi army—namely, continuing to fight the terrorists, both foreign and Iraqi, but fighting the Sunni Arab insurgents as well; working to encourage the Sunnis to opt for politics over violence; and providing a continuing model of military professionalism to the young Iraqi forces. This lacuna damages both attempts to combat the withdrawal-mania that is gripping Washington and the conduct of the war itself.

Until the administration explains why U.S. forces are needed in Iraq, beyond training the Iraqi Security Forces, it will be very difficult for the administration to defend any particular troop levels there. Even accelerated training could take place with far fewer than the 160,000 soldiers in Iraq now if that were all they were doing. As long as CENTCOM continues to state that the presence of American forces is a major catalyst for the insurgency and that the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iraqis should be doing the fighting, it is hard to see how those arguments will suffice to defend troop strengths at the relatively high levels CENTCOM clearly believes are still necessary.

And those higher troop levels are, in fact, vitally necessary, because U.S. forces have a critical role to play beyond training the Iraqi Security Forces. For if American forces did begin to leave Iraq prematurely, the insurgency would grow. First, many insurgents would believe that they had a greater chance of military success against the Iraqis than they have had against the Americans, and so would be newly encouraged to engage in a struggle that many of them now find daunting. Second, they would be right. The Iraqi Security Forces would inevitably operate at lower levels of skill and efficiency than coalition troops. Presenting the insurgents with less-capable government forces would give them opportunities they do not now have. They would work to seize and exploit those opportunities aggressively, if their past behavior is any guide, and the inexperienced Iraqi troops would be hard pressed to respond efficiently.

It is also likely, moreover, that the Iraqi Security Forces themselves would become more brutal as Americans withdrew. Because they have been rushed through training that is cursory compared with the training American forces receive, the Iraqis are inevitably less professional, and professionalism is one of the key shields standing between military forces and the abuse of prisoners and civilians. In addition, the Iraqi troops respect and seek to emulate their American mentors. They know that U.S. forces strongly disapprove of atrocities, and so are less likely to commit them when American forces are around. As U.S. forces left, the strength of that restraint would diminish, and more Iraqi troops would be likely to slip their leashes.

The fact that the Iraqis would find fighting the insurgents by themselves much harder than fighting them with American assistance, finally, would generate the sort of fear and frustration that also breed atrocities. It goes without saying that increasing atrocities committed by predominantly Shiite Iraqi Security Forces would help stir the insurgency and even heighten the specter of civil war. The mere presence of American forces helps to keep this problem to a minimum, and is an important reason to insist that any coalition withdrawal be gradual and paced not only to the pure military capabilities of Iraqi forces, but also to their nascent professionalism.

Above all, it is essential for the coalition to drive the Sunni insurgency down to such a low level that when the rebellion grows as U.S. forces leave, it will not grow beyond the point at which the less-capable Iraqi forces can handle it. The simple number of trained Iraqi troops or units has never been an adequate measure for determining the pace of withdrawal. Any timetable must consider not only that number, but also the probable post-handover strength of the insurgency relative to Iraqi capabilities. And it is vital in the meantime for the United States to be directly involved in the struggle against the insurgents in order to reduce their strength to a level the Iraqis are capable of handling. There are indications that CENTCOM is gingerly adopting this approach, but the military and the administration must publicly embrace and explain it. So far, they have been so concerned with minimizing our footprint and promising our withdrawal that they have not done so.

A New Approach: Clear, Hold, Build

The absence of any clear articulation of an actual counterinsurgency strategy (as opposed to a strategy of training Iraqis to conduct counterinsurgency operations) has lent prominence to a few strategies proposed by outside experts, particularly the "oil spot" strategy advocated recently by Andrew Krepinevich in *Foreign Affairs*. According to this strategy, the United States should abandon its efforts to fight terrorists throughout Iraq and instead focus on establishing a limited number of secured areas where Iraqis can reestablish normal life. These areas could be expanded (like oil spots) over time, gradually bringing all of the country under control. Krepinevich and others rightly point out that the coalition's failure to provide security to many Iraqis in the Sunni Triangle is one of the most serious problems in this war, and he advocates this approach as the best way to tackle the problem with a limited number of U.S. soldiers (Krepinevich argues, in fact, that the United States should reduce its commitment significantly in 2006 while adopting his strategy).

There are serious problems with this proposal, however. Recent American strategy, which some have derisively dubbed "whack-a-mole," has not prioritized controlling territory at all, but instead has focused on lightning raids to capture or kill terrorists and insurgents. This approach has the disadvantage of failing to create secure zones for Iraqi citizens. It has the important advantage, however, of preventing the insurgents from establishing their own safe havens for more than a few months at a time. This is an incredibly important advantage.

As we saw during the battles of Falluja and Tal Afar, allowing the insurgents a long period of time in which to control a population center and prepare to defend it dramatically increases the difficulty of clearing them out. It also allows them to establish training bases; to recruit; to stockpile weapons and supplies; and to export terrorists and equipment to other areas. (And al Qaeda in Iraq does offer training courses to its adherents, complete with blackboard illustrations and demonstrations, in how to make and use Improvised Explosive Devices, how to attack coalition forces, and so on.) By periodically wiping out such enclaves,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the coalition dramatically reduces the range and sophistication of the insurgency—and U.S. commanders in recent weeks have repeatedly testified that the complexity of insurgent attacks is dropping dramatically, and that their effectiveness and lethality are also falling off. It would be unfortunate, while focusing on creating safe havens for Iraqi citizens, if the coalition also created safe havens for the insurgents, which the rebels do not now have.

The other problem with the "oil spot" approach is that it would be less effective than the approach CENTCOM is using on the ground right now, and would, in fact, mark a step backwards in de facto strategy. For CENTCOM has finally figured out that it really does have to control ground in Iraq even while playing "whack-a-mole" with the insurgents, and it has found a way to do so with the existing size of coalition forces in Iraq. The failure to articulate the new approach clearly and dramatically leaves underappreciated the success it is now generating. As a result, there is a real danger that this new approach will be abandoned just when it should be expanded.

The policy often enunciated by President Bush—as Iraqi forces stand up, U.S. forces will stand down—is exactly wrong. As more Iraqi Security Forces become available, the United States should make use of them to pursue critical objectives that the paucity of American forces previously made impossible. As more Iraqi forces stand up, they should join American forces in fighting the insurgents. This is the approach that CENTCOM has been quietly adopting in recent months to good effect. Premature drawdowns—or even promises of drawdowns—of U.S. troops would make it impossible.

Since mid-September, the coalition has conducted a series of major and minor operations in Anbar and Nineveh provinces. They share a common pattern: Joint U.S.-Iraqi combat teams surround and then clear cities and towns with concentrations of terrorists; U.S. forces then withdraw except for small detachments, leaving behind significant Iraqi teams to maintain security; preplanned reconstruction and humanitarian assistance operations then begin, both to make good damage resulting from the combat (which is usually fairly minimal) and to improve the quality of life of the local population beyond its preoperation levels.

The increasing availability of Iraqi troops has allowed the coalition to pursue these operations, which end up securing cleared territory in a way that previous operations did not, without abandoning large areas of Anbar and Nineveh to the rebels, as the oil spot approach would. The result is an overall increase in the number of cleared areas that are being held by Iraqi forces and rebuilt, without the creation of rebel safe havens that store up crises for the future. As of mid-November, coalition and Iraqi forces had cleared and secured the towns of Husaybah, Karabilah, Hit, Haditha, Barwana, Haqlaniya, Saddah, Rawah, Amiriya, and Faris, all along the Iraq-Syria border. Coalition forces in other operations cleared out Tal Afar, al Qaim, Ramadi, and other trouble spots. Much remains to be done, and a spokesman for the Iraqi prime minister recently noted that he needs more forces in Diyala province and elsewhere, but this is a very promising start for a new approach.

Unfortunately, CENTCOM may have adopted this correct approach for the wrong reasons. The focus of all of these operations, according to CENTCOM spokesmen, is to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq by controlling the towns of the Euphrates River valley through which they travel. Moreover, the need to provide security in the Sunni Triangle before the December elections has given this task greater urgency in CENTCOM's eyes. Although both considerations are important, they are short-term problems, especially the focus on the election. The danger is that CENTCOM, under pressure from those concerned with the Army's well-being and those who simply wish to give up on Iraq, will abandon these solid efforts just when they should be redoubled and expanded.

There is no question that the presence of foreign fighters in Iraq is an important element of the insurgency. Although al Qaeda's attacks make up a relatively small proportion of attacks, they tend to be the most spectacular and, therefore, the most damaging on the American home front. There is no question, moreover, that Zarqawi is a dangerous foe who must be hunted down and captured or killed, and the United States dare not take the pressure off him and allow him to reconstitute his increasingly ragged forces.

But, as the commander of Multinational Force West, Major General Stephen T. Johnson, recently noted, "The insurgents in Al Anbar province, north Babil province, are largely locally based insurgents; that is, the insurgent we fight here is from here, he's from those communities in which we are engaging them." He added that local Sunnis formed the "vast majority" of the rebels he was combating. It is by no means clear that the elimination of foreign fighters, mostly tied to al Qaeda, will suppress this local insurgency, and efforts to focus on it run the risk of distracting attention from the problem that will ultimately determine the outcome of the Iraqi democratic experiment—bringing the Sunni Arabs peacefully into the political process.

The focus on preparing the Sunni Triangle for the elections is also necessary but problematic. It is impossible to overstate the importance of ensuring that Sunni Arabs can vote safely, of course, since that is a critical part of persuading them to abjure violence and embrace political solutions to their problems. But this week's elections will not solve the problem. The Sunni Arabs have so far pursued three different paths to regaining control over Iraq, which many of them feel is their birthright. They boycotted the January

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vote in an effort to delegitimize it. When that failed, they turned out in droves in October, hoping to vote down a constitution that they did not like. That effort also failed, and now many Sunni Arab leaders are calling for widespread participation in the December elections in the hopes of forming a powerful voting bloc that can reorder Iraq's affairs to their liking through the political process. The critical question is how the vote actually goes and how the Sunni Arab community reacts to the result.

It is possible, as some analysts argue, that the Sunni Arab bloc may end up being the second largest in the new parliament, giving the Sunni Arabs ample scope and considerable power in the new political system. Such a result could reduce the force of the rejectionist insurgency considerably. If the elections go otherwise, however, or if even a powerful Sunni Arab bloc is unable to make the desired changes in the constitution or get its way in other policy matters, or if hotheaded rebel leaders manage to gain the support of the population for any of a host of other possible reasons, then the insurgency could flare up dramatically despite a large Sunni Arab turnout at the polls.

It is therefore a mistake to see the elections as necessarily a turning point. American strategy should prepare for the worse cases, if not the worst, and be ready to handle an uptick in the insurgency over the next several months. If all goes well and it becomes clear that the insurgency really is dying down, then the few months' delay in beginning to draw down our forces will not be very significant to the Army or anything else. If all does not go well, then the United States will be poised to respond quickly and before things can get too far out of hand.

The presence or absence of sizable American forces will also play a vital role in determining whether the Sunni Arabs opt for violence or politics in the wake of the elections, and we must not underestimate this role. The more areas of the Sunni Triangle coalition forces have been able to clear and hold, the fewer the potential bases and safe havens for terrorists and insurgents. The more Iraqi troops are well established in those towns, the more likely they are to get early warning of potential problems and to be able to nip them in the bud, with or without American help. Now is not the time to set timetables or make promises about withdrawing forces to please domestic constituencies. Now is the time to make it clear that the progress of clearing and holding the Sunni Triangle will continue inexorably, and will even accelerate, as more and more Iraqi troops come on line. This is the best way to dash the insurgents' hope that we will withhold the coup de grâce and let up on them just when we might have the chance to finish them off. It is the best route to persuading the Sunni Arabs that their only hope is in the peaceful political process.

CENTCOM thus far has been successful—almost unintentionally—in these recent operations. As it happens, the process of clearing towns of al Qaeda and holding them against foreign fighters also disables Sunni rejectionists (anyone with weapons or bomb-making materials is caught up in the sweeps), and the establishment of garrisons of Iraqi forces in the wake of these operations makes possible early warning against both kinds of attacks. But the focus on the borders is, in the long run, unfortunate, since there continue to be problems in the interior of the country. CENTCOM should maintain its new approach, but adopt a new target. The goal should be *clearing and holding Baghdad and the entire Sunni Triangle at whatever pace the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces will allow, all the while continuing to attack al Qaeda and Sunni holdouts as necessary*, even when "leave-behind" Iraqi troops are not available. It should be a top priority to clear both Baghdad and Ramadi as quickly as possible. If that means accepting greater risk of cross-border infiltration, so be it. It will almost certainly mean maintaining an undiminished American presence in Iraq for months to come, and it is worth accepting the risks involved in that decision as well.

The situation in Iraq presents a firmer basis for optimism today than it ever has before. The challenges remain great, and failure will continue to be a real possibility for months if not years to come. The greatest danger to success in Iraq now lies on the American home front, in the danger that misrepresentations of Iraqi reality, politically motivated policy demands, and simple fear, exhaustion, and confusion will undermine the commitment necessary to succeed. The other danger is that those who do want to succeed—the Bush administration, CENTCOM—will inadvertently undermine our commitment by continuing mistakenly to emphasize the damage the American presence does to the prospects for success.

The goal of a counterinsurgency is to defeat the insurgents militarily and politically. In the long run, of course, the Iraqis themselves will have to maintain order in their own land. That does not mean they can defeat this rebellion alone. The U.S. military has capabilities to locate targets, move forces rapidly to their locations, strike them with precision while minimizing collateral damage, and begin reconstruction far beyond anything the Iraqi military will have for a long time. In addition, American soldiers and Marines have a much higher level of professionalism and detachment from this struggle. They have been playing a vital role in suppressing the rebellion, and they will have to continue to play that role for the foreseeable future. Continued U.S. military engagement is needed for success in Iraq—success that seems now to be closer than it has ever been—if we hold fast to the sound strategy for victory that has recently emerged, and do not lose our nerve. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Graying of the 'Greening of America'

Charles Reich's famous book turns 35, but seems as juvenile as ever

By David Skinner

Thirty-five years ago, Charles Reich's book *The Greening of America* arrived like a tidal wave in the already roiled waters of American public debate. Published as a 25,000-word essay in the September 26, 1970, *New Yorker*, it elicited from the magazine's 463,000 readers more mail than any single article before it ever had. The issue quickly sold out, while copies of the much longer book were scarce, though it eventually went through over 20 printings. The *New York Times* alone published about a dozen articles on the subject, two of them by Reich himself, a few more commenting on the cultural changes heralded by *The Greening of America*, and several others taking issue with the book.

Widely panned by reviewers, it nonetheless found some well-known boosters. Critic Dwight Macdonald compared it to prominent bestsellers like David Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd* and Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd*. Nicholas von Hoffman of the *Washington Post* put in a good word for Reich's take on modern society. Where the book really struck a chord was with readers. The paperback edition gave over three pages to blurbs from people like Mrs. Frederick Anderson of Pipersville, Pennsylvania: "Thank you for such a remarkably perceptive and brilliant explanation of the United States my husband and I are trying to understand and feel so frustrated about most of the time." Even Reich's critics conceded it an "extraordinary literary and political event."

Reich, a previously little-known faculty member at Yale Law School, became famous—too much so for his taste. "Being a celebrity," he later wrote, "meant having my days and nights filled with unceasing demands, questions, attacks, interruptions." He soon retreated from New Haven to San Francisco, where he has lived ever since. Within a few years, the "new consciousness" that his book exalts had, even Reich conceded, "gone into hiding." Reich published a couple more books, a memoir in 1976 that was mostly ignored and marked the end of his status as a commentator of note, and the other, almost twenty years later, a monotone screed against the modern state that caused no stir at all. *Greening* remains a classic example of the big-think book that captures the popular imagination, though its message—that a new era in human history was upon us—like its author, soon faded into obscurity, to be remembered rarely and then mostly to be ridiculed.

But among the overheated, overreaching, radical books of the late '60s and early '70s, *The Greening of America* stands out, not only for its sweeping ambition and meteoric popularity, but also for its winning, energetic style. *Greening* distilled much of the radical literature that preceded it, from Karl Marx to the beatniks and the alienated New York intellectuals, with a naive joy and earnestness all its own.

And it had this interesting angle: Reich was no overgrown hippie, but a former Supreme Court clerk, an Ivy League professor, a presumptively serious person. He was also an adult, 42 when the book was published, which reinforced his credibility with adult readers to whom he ventured to explain the behavior of the young—in many cases, the readers' own children. With the young themselves, Reich had less credibility, for he chronicled the new generation and its psycho-social-sexual-political revelations not as an insider, but as a self-appointed spokesman and enthusiast. He was a fan of the long-haired, dungareed kids he met on campus, and he believed they were onto something big.

The Greening of America argued that the United States was in the midst of an all-consuming spiritual and political crisis, for which the only cure was a new kind of revolution, "a revolution by conscious-

David Skinner is an assistant managing editor at The Weekly Standard.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ness." War and poverty, uncontrolled technology and the destruction of the environment, the Corporate State and bureaucracy, the artificiality of work and culture, the absence of community—all had conspired to produce the most "devastating" impoverishment of all, the "loss of self, or death in life." Yet there was hope, for the crisis was calling forth its own antidote: a movement to reclaim "a higher reason, a more human community, and a new and liberated individual." That movement—which Reich predicted would eventually grow to include all Americans—was none other than the youth culture of the 1960s.

Reich's most original and catchy contribution was his invention of three levels of consciousness. Consciousness I, formed in the 19th century, was "the traditional outlook of the American farmer, small businessman, and worker . . . trying to get ahead." By the second half of the 20th century, this survived as the heartless, pre-New Deal, free-market individualism of the right. Consciousness II, formed in the first half of the 20th century, represented "the values of an organizational society,"—institutions, logic, meritocracy, conformity—which covered over the alienation of the individual with a phony, Kennedyesque, Great Society reform spirit exemplified by East Coast liberalism. Consciousness III, "just emerging," was the spirit of the student movement, which epitomized the most free, the most authentic, the most egalitarian, and the most evolved generation America had ever seen.

A beneficent shift in consciousness was under way, Reich announced, and it came to America courtesy of the kids, the hippies and radical students, the dropouts and rock 'n' rollers. They were showing the way forward not only with their refusal to join the power structure, but also with their music, clothing, drugs, and V-signs (the index and middle finger, signaling "peace"). *The Greening of America* lavished careful attention on blue jeans, organic peanut butter, the drug scene, the new music, even the sport of Frisbee, and all the other stand-bys of the Consciousness III lifestyle. Indeed, Reich's book announced the triumph of the liberated "lifestyle" (a word newly in vogue at the time) over any "pre-existing system," institution, or technology. It was not merely that the revolutionaries happened to prefer informal clothes, loud music, and food grown in communal plots. Rather, these were essential expressions of what was going to replace the rigid and repressive American system of government and the unnatural and deadening American way of life.

Reich's claims for the new lifestyle were, to put it mildly, grandiose. "The present transformation," he wrote in the book's climactic chapter,

> goes beyond anything in modern history. Beside it, a mere revolution, such as the French or the Russian, seems inconsequential—a shift in the base of power. Moreover, almost none of the [standard radical] views . . . recognizes the crucial importance of *choosing a new lifestyle*. This has been passed over as if it were no more than an indulgent product of affluence, a more tolerant form of 'administered happiness.' But choice of a lifestyle is not peripheral, it is the heart of the new awakening. What is coming is nothing less than a new way of life and a new man. [Italics in the original.]

For all the serious attention Reich received on the left, the reaction from moderate Democrats and almost everyone right of center was emphatic. The sociologist Nathan Glazer, writing in the *New Leader*, said his main difficulty with the book was that "the author's view of existing reality is so different from mine." Where Reich had pronounced the First Amendment moribund, for example, Glazer asserted that "the Bill of Rights has never been stronger," noting that "appeals to revolution and violence and pornography flourish [in the press] as never before." In *Commentary*, Roger Starr, longtime executive director of the Citizens Housing and Planning Council in New York City, challenged Reich's grasp of ordinary facts, from details of American history to housing policy.

Sparring over particulars did not interest some of Reich's antagonists, who went straight for the knockout

The Greening of America

There is a revolution coming. It will not be like revolutions of the past. It will originate with the individual and with culture, and it will change the political structure only as its final act. It will not require violence to succeed, and it cannot be successfully resisted by violence. This is the revolution of the new generation.

Charles A. Reich

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

punch. "I feel as Dr. Johnson did about the plot of *Cymbeline*," wrote the English essayist Malcolm Muggeridge, "that [*The Greening of America*] is beyond criticism because one cannot criticize unresisting imbecility." R. Emmett Tyrrell Jr., writing a few years later in his *American Spectator*, thought Reich a perfect symbol for all that was wrong with the left in the '70s. *The Greening of America* was "not just moronic." It was "pristine ritualistic liberalism."

Charles Reich lives in the Russian Hill neighborhood of San Francisco. More Mister Rogers than Angry Old Radical, he was wearing a big red sweater and Converse sneakers the day I saw him. His curly hair was white and mussy, much shorter than in his publicity shots from the '70s. We sat in a front room of the townhouse where he lives—he rents the first floor—with an old-looking computer, a day bed, and walls hung with personal memorabilia and simple pieces of art. It was an unstylish interior reminiscent of countless apartments occupied by older, bookish people who have long stopped redecorating.

Charles Reich

The protocol was simple: He talked, I listened.

The book started as a brief outline Reich wrote and Random House purchased. "Then it was simply ignored by the editorial people while I went ahead and wrote it. And then, at a very, very belated stage, someone looked at it and they absolutely hated it." The title, the contents, everything. "And they made an institutional decision to kill it off. . . . They said, 'We're not even going to try to sell this book, we're going to remainder it on Fourth Avenue.'" A tiny print run followed, with no accompanying publicity.

At the time, Reich's mother was the principal at a fancy uptown nursery school in Manhattan, where one of the pupils was the child of *New Yorker* writer Lillian Ross and (though it was not then publicly known) *New Yorker* editor William Shawn. Reich's proud mother mentioned to Ross that her son had written a book. Ross asked to see it and ended up showing the manuscript of *The Greening of America* to the legendary Mister Shawn.

"He simply read it as bedtime reading in his second home," says Reich. "He had the same direct experience reading it that later readers did." And it won him over. "He called me up immediately. He didn't consult with any underling. . . . He just said, 'We want it, right away. . . . Come to New York.'"

The enormous interest generated by the *New Yorker*'s "Greening of America" boded well for book sales. By this time, however, Reich and Random House were no longer speaking to each other. Recalls Reich: "There's a demand for fifty thousand, a hundred thousand of the books, and they don't have any books to offer anybody. Their liberal snobbishness is in conflict with their capitalist inclinations."

(A digression may be useful here on Reich's relation to "liberalism." Such is his scorn in *The Greening of America* for the well-off, class-conscious, right-thinking Democrat that one might be forgiven for concluding—were it not for all the America-bashing—that what the guy hated most was liberal establishment snobs. During our interview, Reich—once the darling of the quintessentially liberal *New Yorker* set—nevertheless spoke with contempt of the liberal grandees who would be given VIP treatment as they paraded around places like Yale, the "landed nobility" who were "the arbiters of what was correct behavior or demeanor." One even suspects that some of his fans may have been moderately conservative types with a little Goldwater in their hearts. "Liberalism," Reich says, "had acquired its own aristocratic tone by this time, its own pretentiousness, its own manners." One effect of such a liberalism, says Reich, is that it "keeps most people quiet most of the time.")

As Reich and Shawn wrapped up their business and took leave of each other, Reich recalls, Shawn said to him, "Well, we're greatly indebted to you for this wonderful article. I wonder if there's anything we can do for you."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reich said there was and explained his problems with Random House. On the spot, Shawn telephoned Bennett Cerf, the head of Random House, who told Shawn to send Reich over.

"I got over there and I was presented to Mr. Cerf himself," Reich remembers, "and the first thing he said was, 'Why you're a nice Jewish boy, why are they treating you so badly downstairs?'" Cerf took Reich to "21" for lunch and gave him the cover and subtitle he wanted and ended up selling a great many books.

One result of this unusual passage to publication was that the book "was never edited, ever." Reich complains that the editing his work received at the *New Yorker* made the article's opening passage sound far too sunny, only he didn't want to complain because he was so grateful to Shawn.

Nor was the book marketed in today's sense. Few *New Yorker* readers could have known who Charles Reich was, since he had published only a few articles before this and none in the *New Yorker*, which, in any case, in those days provided no information about its contributors except their names. About two months passed, then, between the publication of the excerpt and the printing of enough copies to address the sudden demand. And only after that did reviews begin to appear. The upside to these months of hubbub uninfluenced by any spin was that *New Yorker* readers and many book-buyers came to *The Greening of America* with few preconceived notions about the author or his politics.

This favored Reich in two ways. The absence of organized hype surely made *Greening*'s enthralled account of the youth culture seem more striking and newsworthy. And it allowed Reich to catch his would-be naysayers unprepared. Shocking friends and enemies was a proven skill of his.

Years before *The Greening of America*, Reich had made a lesser but notable splash with an article for the *New Republic*. Published in 1962, it criticized President Kennedy for using mafia tactics to bully the steel industry into lowering its prices. The article caused such outrage that the *New Republic* gave over a whole section of a subsequent issue to criticizing it, with one respondent calling Reich's piece "sheer poppycock." (Years later, the *New Republic* did something very similar when it ran an excerpt of Charles Murray's *The Bell Curve*.) Here and in *The Greening of America*, Reich says, he unintentionally bypassed a kind of "liberal censorship."

If so, the critics soon caught up with him. And they were no less tough for being slow off the blocks. Speaking for respectable liberals, the *New York Times*'s book reviewer Christopher Lehmann-Haupt deflated Reich as the Norman Vincent Peale of youth culture. Herbert Marcuse, dean of the radical intellectuals, was less amused, calling Reich's vision of effortless, nonviolent revolution "the Establishment version of the great rebellion." And Reich's fellow academics were pleased to twist the knife. Robert Brustein, then head of the Yale Drama School, complained to the *Times* about the "strain of sentimentality running through some members of the Yale faculty, a strain of general unworldliness, that takes its form in flattering students by all but becoming one." And then: "It's okay to hang around all of the time with students, as Charlie does, but this is the first time that anybody has ever tried to base an ideology on it."

R. Emmett Tyrrell, of all people, agreed with Reich that liberals were out to get him—and get him to shut up. After *The Greening of America*, Tyrrell wrote, "Poor Charlie was entombed in a conspiracy of silence." Why? Because "in the midst of the most lunatic discourse he would suddenly gain his composure, clear his throat, and launch a pious declaration." Such as: "I cannot accept living in a country where people feel powerless to affect their lives. I am unwilling to overlook injustice, cruelty, and oppression. I cannot in good conscience live in a country that imprisons people, humiliates them, degrades them, or ignores their basic humanity.'"

This indeed was a tic of Reich's. He was always bravely taking a stand against the most obvious offenses—as if the wrongness of oppression or injustice was a point of controversy. The problem with this habit is, to keep it fed, you need to accuse the powers that be of practically every crime in the book, which Reich more or less did—but which anyone who wants to remain a part of the American political mainstream cannot do.

Offering another instance of "liberal censorship," Reich told me of a letter he received about his second book, *The Sorcerer of Bolinas Reef*, from someone he would identify only as "a liberal icon." *The Sorcerer* was an interesting, though painfully frank, memoir of Reich's transformation from young Washington lawyer to middle-aged spokesperson for the new consciousness. In describing his personal liberation, the hypersensitive Reich recounts how, as a 43-year-old virgin, he had his first sexual encounter with a young male prostitute. The letter from the "liberal icon" said, in its entirety, "You have told me more about your prick than I wanted to know."

Reich says he doesn't understand why liberals took out after *Greening of America* with such gusto, but he believes it has something to do with blue jeans. "One element that unquestionably outraged" the right-thinking liberals, says Reich, was "the rather sensual description of blue jeans." Indeed, one could go

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

further and say that without its awestruck passages concerning the newly pervasive apparel, *The Greening of America* probably wouldn't have been half as successful.

"Jeans make one conscious of the body, not as something separate from the face but as part of the whole individual." Even better:

> Bell bottoms have to be worn to be understood. They express the body, as jeans do, but they say much more. They give the ankles a special freedom as if to invite dancing right on the street. . . . A touch football game, if the players are wearing bell bottoms, is like a folk dance or a ballet. . . . The new clothes demonstrate a significant new relationship between man and technology.

Writers have always used real-life details to illustrate points about politics and society; Reich went further. He took the accouterments of self-indulgent youth and presented them with all the solemnity of a pothead describing his THC-induced illumination. Reich's depictions of hippie life, which sugarcoat the drug scene, make sexual promiscuity seem noble, and offer radical politics as an unquestionably reasonable and constructive occupation for the educated and uneducated alike, are almost comic. He likens the psychedelic experience to "what happens when a person with fuzzy vision puts on glasses." And so on: "Marijuana is a maker of revolution, a truth-serum."

This uncritical acceptance of hippie cant was Reich's central error. In market terms, however, it was a brilliant stroke of intellectual slumming, no less compelling for being sincere. Americans are willing enough to believe that even a man whose ideas seem indefensible should be given an honest hearing. Reich took his case for revolution and ran with it, piling assertion upon assertion, trying to win—and in commercial terms winning—by sheer boldness.

What lingers thirty-five years on is the sense that Reich's investigative method was itself important to the way we write and argue today. Consciousnesses I, II, and III may have ultimately *not* caught on, but the search, undertaken by more and more serious writers and intellectuals, for truth about American culture in the idle choices of consumers, in this fall's fashion lines, in the exact details of our latest materialistic obsessions, is a legacy partly from Reich (as well as from a brilliant contemporary he cites, Tom Wolfe). This way of telling the story of American society endures—think of David Brooks's "comic sociology," best exemplified by his *Bobos in Paradise*. It is, if anything, too much with us, from popular novels that take their titles from brand names to television characters who prove their wit by their fluency in retailspeak.

Reich's unwarranted leap was in believing that profound changes in fashion presaged the transformation of the political order and the emergence of a "new way of living" and "a new man." Today, rapacious capitalists wear, what else, blue jeans on casual Friday and lunch at restaurants that serve only the finest, freshest, local and seasonal ingredients. The approved, organic lifestyle of *The Greening of America* did signal a coming change in how Americans were thinking about food and jeans and music, but those were its rough limits. It hardly routed agribusiness or deprived today's antiglobalization puppeteers—perhaps Reich's truest heirs—of their favorite target in America-the-corporate-Satan.

Reich's unwarranted leap was in believing that profound changes in fashion presaged the transformation of the political order and the emergence of a "new way of living" and "a new man."

And the rest was generational narcissism. Our eventual Boomer president may have been annoying (and law-breaking) in ways only a child of the '60s could be, but he was no revolutionary. The Boomers grew to love meritocracy and started moving up through the great, hated Establishment. Most people agree that the attempt to elevate casual sex, drug use, and the new music scene to the status of a new Enlightenment turned out to be a major intellectual and cultural mistake that even the Boomers, now well into middle age, are struggling to redress.

The most important words in *The Greening of America* were "lifestyle" and "revolution." "Spreading this lifestyle is the revolution," wrote one of Reich's defenders, Joel Kramer, in the *Village Voice*, combining in one fatuous declarative sentence the linguistic and intellectual slovenliness that has turned us all into close-readers of lifestyles but left us ready to declare a revolution at the turn of the television dial.

And then there's "greening." Reich likes to point out that the phrase "greening of America" must be one of the most mimicked in all of journalism. Surprisingly, *Merriam Webster's Dictionary* defines "greening"—as in "book by C. Reich"—as "becoming more mature and less naive." But what Reich did was actually the opposite. All these years later, it's hard to see that he was up to much in his forgotten bestseller beyond gushing over the kids and raising radical clichés to the status of profundity. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Enjoy seven days and nights cruising the Mexican Riviera with your favorite Weekly Standard writers . . .

. . . and get the inside scoop on the Bush presidency from Fred Barnes, author of Rebel-in-Chief, forthcoming in January.



- Special private Weekly Standard sessions and programs
- Dining with editors and writers
- Traveling with like-minded conservatives
- Private receptions
- All-inclusive pricing
- A fully escorted cruise

Fred Barnes

And join conversations with Bill Kristol, Fred Barnes, Terry Eastland, Philip Terzian, Stephen F. Hayes, Jonathan V. Last, and our special guest, contributing editor John Podhoretz.

The 2006 Weekly Standard Cruise Itinerary

Date	*Day*	*Ports of Call*
Feb. 25	Sat.	San Diego, CA
Feb. 26	Sun.	At Sea
Feb. 27	Mon.	Cabo San Lucas, Mexico
Feb. 28	Tue.	Mazatlan, Mexico
Mar. 1	Wed.	Puerto Vallarta, Mexico
Mar. 2	Thu.	At Sea
Mar. 3	Fri.	At Sea
Mar. 4	Sat.	San Diego, CA

the weekly Standard

Holland America

THE CRUISE AUTHORITY

For more information, call 1-800-266-4043 or visit www.TWScruise.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America's Critic

Edmund Wilson, mandarin in chief

BY JAMES SEATON



Bettmann / Corbis / Sylvia Salmi

Over his long career Edmund Wilson (1895-1972) produced a body of work that is, perhaps, the most impressive in quantity and quality of any 20th-century literary critic. Lewis Dabney's new biography does what the biography of a great writer should do above all else: It sends the reader to the writer's books and essays with fresh enthusiasm.

Dabney traces Wilson's career from its beginning in the twenties, when, as a general reviewer for first *Vanity Fair* and then the *New Republic*, Wilson championed Ernest Hemingway's early short stories, explained why the Minsky Brothers' Follies were superior to Ziegfeld's, and declared that Harry Houdini's career as a magician and escape artist "showed a rare integrity." Wilson's stature as a literary critic was confirmed by the success of *Axel's Castle* (1931), a study of the writers now known as modernists (a term Wilson hated, Dabney points out). Since its publication, *Axel's Castle* has been recognized as the best introduction to the generation of Eliot, Joyce, and Proust, writers whose seemingly impenetrable works were shown by Wilson to possess broad human significance.

James Seaton is professor of English at Michigan State.

In the thirties Wilson, like many other literary intellectuals, turned left. *To the Finland Station* (1940) is a study of Marxism that remains readable today, despite its thesis that Lenin's revolution should be taken as a sign "that Western man at this moment can be seen to have made some definite progress." (Dabney goes further, calling the book "the most significant imaginative work to come out of the thirties in the United States except for several of Faulkner's novels.") In the essays collected in *The Triple Thinkers* (1938) and *The Wound and the Bow* (1941), Wilson assimilated the new ideas of psychoanalysis without letting them become a controlling system.

Edmund Wilson
by Lewis M. Dabney
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 656 pp., $35

Wilson was often at his best in the short reviews and essays assembled in three collections: *The Shores of Light* (1952), his essays from the twenties and thirties; *Classics and Commercials* (1950), the reviews, mostly from the *New Yorker*, of the forties; and *The Bit Between My Teeth* (1965), taken from the *New Yorker* and the *New York Review of Books*. In the fifties and sixties he investigated and wrote about, among other things, the Dead Sea scrolls, the Iroquois of upstate New York, and the French culture of Quebec. The big book of his later years was *Patriotic Gore* (1962), a study of the writing of the Civil War era, including

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not only literary works but also diaries, memoirs, and speeches, which remains, despite its combatively reductive preface, one of the great works of American literary and cultural criticism. Meanwhile, Wilson wrote fiction and plays, reported on the United States during the Depression and Europe after World War II, compiled memoirs like *Upstate* (1971), and throughout his career kept voluminous diaries, which have been published posthumously.

Wilson's unceasing productivity was sustained while he went through many affairs and four marriages, including an especially tumultuous one to the beautiful, talented, and much younger Mary McCarthy, all the while maintaining a drinking habit that would have incapacitated most people. (Dabney comments that "Wilson was the only well-known literary alcoholic of his generation whose work was not compromised by his drinking, but alcohol undermined his marriages.") There is a lot here for any biographer to deal with. Indeed, David Castronovo and Janet Groth have written a book, *Critic in Love*, focusing only on Wilson's relations with women. Dabney deserves high praise for his success in balancing his narrative of Wilson's personal life with lucid accounts of the essays and books that provide the only reasons Wilson's drinking or his sexual activity should concern anybody beyond friends and family.

The biography offers no overall assessment of Edmund Wilson's critical stature, though Dabney does mention approvingly Isaiah Berlin's view that Wilson was "the most important critic" of the 20th century. Perhaps because Wilson cannot be definitively linked with any one critical method or political ideology, it has been difficult for his admirers to explain exactly why his criticism remains fresh and rewarding today, even though research and criticism on almost all the figures he discusses has increased exponentially since his own essays and books were written.

One way to grasp Wilson's achievement is to compare his work with that of the critics he himself respected. In *Classics and Commercials* he offers a tribute to his late Princeton classmate T.K. Whipple, the author of two books on American literature, *Spokesmen* (1928) and the posthumous *Study Out the Land* (1943). Whipple, like Wilson, turned left in the thirties, but, unlike many others, the two managed, in the end, to keep their balance. He praises his friend for writing criticism that remained "unhysterical and unstampeded" despite his leftism. Wilson calls Whipple "the first of our critics to study the new novelists and dramatists and poets at the same time appreciatively and calmly, to try to see the work of each as a whole and to make some sort of summary of it." This generous praise describes Wilson's own criticism more accurately than it does his classmate's fine work.

Two essays in *Classics and Commercials* praise George Saintsbury, the turn-of-the-20th-century English critic whose opinions were very different from Wilson's—"in religion he was Church of England and in politics an extreme Tory"—who wins Wilson's praise because "his prejudices were rarely allowed to interfere with his appetite for good literature, wherever and by whomever written." Wilson even argues that Saintsbury's extreme political opinions give his criticism a dramatic interest it would not have otherwise, "provided by the recurring conflict between Saintsbury's Tory principles and the productions of those of his subjects who hold contrary opinions. The thrill for the reader results from Saintsbury's displays of gallantry in recognizing and applauding the literary merit of writers whose views he abhors."

Of course the quasi-Marxist Wilson's treatment of the Tory Saintsbury itself exemplifies the same "gallantry." Similarly, Wilson's masterpiece, *Patriotic Gore*, gains in dramatic quality as the reader waits to see if Wilson will treat Lincoln, Grant, Alexander Stephens, and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. with the reductivism that the "sea-slug" theory of history announced in the preface would seem to demand. Wilson seems to be characterizing his own work when he notes both Saintsbury's limitation and his strength: "[I]t is true, as has sometimes been said of him, that he does not plumb the deepest literature deeply. But at least he has arrived by himself at his reasons for the greatness of the greatest. He never takes merits for granted."

The 18th-century rationalism that was an enduring part of Wilson's intellectual equipment did, indeed, keep him from appreciating fully those writers whose vision either transcended, or at least differed radically, from that outlook, as his once-notorious "Dissenting Opinion on Kafka" illustrates. Yet Wilson's essays also demonstrate his own insistence on judging for himself, whether he is considering would-be "classics" or "commercials" like the latest bestseller. Ready to condemn Somerset Maugham despite "his swelling reputation" as "a half-trashy novelist, who writes badly, but is patronized by half-serious readers, who do not care much about writing," Wilson finds that the religious best-seller *The Robe*, despite being written with "an almost unrivaled fabric of old clichés," nevertheless has an imaginative integrity that gives the novel "a certain purity" and makes the author worthy of "a certain respect." Lloyd Douglas, the author, "has imagined the whole thing for himself," and thus "his book, on a lower level, has the same kind of dramatic effectiveness as Bernard Shaw's *Saint Joan*."

Wilson's personal life, especially his troubled marriage to Mary McCarthy, has sometimes been used to impugn his reputation as a judicious literary critic, as have his political opinions, which changed over his career but were consistently less than perspicacious. In the presidential election of 1932 he endorsed the Communist candidate William Z. Foster. In *To the Finland Station* Lenin is presented as a heroic figure whose practical sagacity is matched by his humanity: "Lenin was one of the most selfless of great men . . . He regarded his political opponents not as competitors who had to be crushed, but as colleagues he had regrettably lost or collaborators he had failed to recruit." In *The Cold War and the Income Tax* Wilson complains with vehemence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and moral indignation about the income tax after being taken to court by the IRS for not filing returns for nine years. (Wilson explains he had been "unaware that failure to file had been made a serious offense.") The preface to *Patriotic Gore* characterizes the United States and the Soviet Union as equally amoral agglomerations of power, sea-slugs each attempting to swallow the other, and suggests that the South's rebellion in the Civil War should be understood as an attempt to avoid being swallowed by the sea-slug North.

Beyond the question these opinions raise about Wilson's political sagacity, they, like his personal life, raise the larger issue as to whether the study of literature really does make for deeper insights and greater wisdom about human affairs, as the humanistic tradition affirms, and as Wilson himself firmly believed. One response may be found in the answer Evelyn Waugh reportedly gave when Nancy Mitford demanded that he explain how he squared "being so horrible with being a Christian." Waugh replied that were he "not a Christian [he] would be even more horrible."


Mary McCarthy

Bettmann / Corbis / Sylvia Salmi

If it is impossible to gauge the influence, or lack of it, of Wilson's literary faith on his personal life, it can be surmised that the political and ideological judgments expressed in his writings, ill-advised as these sometimes are, would have vitiated his work much more than they, in fact, do if he had not been determined to maintain an independent literary judgment in all circumstances whatsoever. Thus, *To the Finland Station*, with the exception of its portrait of Lenin, retains a sense of the complexity and variety of human beings that prevents it from descending to the cheap polemics and vulgar Marxism so common among literary intellectuals of the period. Similarly, the body of *Patriotic Gore* refutes the reductivism of its preface in the most effective way possible, by bringing out through close studies of literary works and individual lives the inevitable failure of any historical theory, including the one offered in the preface, claiming to explain them all.

Dabney's biography, sure to be the definitive work for many years, will be welcomed by all those who love Edmund Wilson, but it will be especially valuable to the many English graduate students and professors who have either never heard of Wilson or know only that he is one of those hopelessly outdated, untheoretical critics who flourished in the benighted era before postmodernism, but who can now be safely ignored. Wilson's current status in academia can be gauged by the attention he receives in the two most influential anthologies of criticism, *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism* and *Critical Theory Since*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Plato. The *Norton* devotes to 20th-century criticism more than 1,500 of its 2,624 pages, of which Wilson is allotted 12, while he does not appear at all in *Since Plato*. Admirers of Wilson may take comfort, however, in noting that his shabby treatment by the two anthologies puts him in select company: Lionel Trilling, one of his few peers in literary criticism, is missing from both.

Both Trilling and Wilson insisted on making connections between literature and the larger society, and yet neither was willing to reduce literary criticism to a subdivision of psychology, sociology, or anything else. Both were influenced by Marx and Freud, and both were generally on the political left; yet if both are virtually nonpersons in the academy today, it is because each continued to believe in the priority of literature over theoretical or ideological systems. Wilson did not have, as T.S. Eliot said of Henry James, "a mind so fine that no idea could violate it." And yet his writing, if not his politics, remained almost unscathed from his encounters with Marx and Freud. The Freudianism of *The Wound and the Bow*, for example, is worn so lightly that the validity of the connections Wilson draws between the life and work of Charles Dickens or Rudyard Kipling does not depend at all on acceptance of Freudian formulas.

Wilson's criticism exemplifies his belief that "nothing was quite so important as literature, and that literature was never to be treated as an end in itself," the outlook that Joseph Epstein ascribes to Matthew Arnold, a model for both Wilson and Trilling. Arnold was one of the great humanist critics, part of a tradition that believed good literature was not only a source of refined pleasure for an elite, but also a rich source of insight about human life that could and should be made available to as many readers as possible. Arnold declared in *Culture and Anarchy* that it was "the men of culture [who] are the true apostles of equality" since it is they "who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time."

Dabney makes a strong case that Wilson succeeded over his long career in fulfilling Arnold's ideal, at least as well and, perhaps, better than any other writer of the 20th century in any language. The contemporary academy's lack of interest in Wilson is, in large part, explained by its hostility to this humanistic ideal. The *Norton Anthology* considerably understates this opposition in acknowledging that Arnold's "ideal is one that radical critics and contemporary literary theorists have sought to complicate or undermine."

Dabney offers no sustained argument against the academy's dismissal of Wilson, but he occasionally contrasts Wilson's positions with those of the current orthodoxy, usually managing to imply convincingly that it is the contemporary academy that suffers by the comparison. Noting Wilson's observation, in the course of a generally sympathetic chapter in *Axel's Castle*, that Gertrude Stein's effort "to detach words from ordinary meanings" was "misguided," Dabney adds that Wilson's reasonable criticism of Stein's technique marks "Wilson's distance from post-structuralists who would one day judge words to be unhinged from their signification."

Noting that Wilson took issue with Paul Valéry's "prediction that, in cultures dominated by radio, movies, and television, literature would become purposeless in its endless introspection and quest for novelty," Dabney comments that Wilson thus anticipated and rejected "what would be called postmodernism." Wilson's distinction between Dante the political activist and Dante the poet places the critic in opposition not only to Wilson's contemporaries the New Critics, but also to "those leftist theorists who, at the tail end of the 20th century, were to find aesthetic taste arbitrary, all writing political." Wilson's "Marxism and Literature" rejects "the view of art as a weapon," a view "fashionable during the Popular Front" of the thirties and also "among English department theorists half a century later." And Dabney contrasts Wilson's observation that the Marquis de Sade used "whips and knives and poisoned aphrodisiacs" only "on women who were his social inferiors" with the glossing-over of this point by "the Sade cult of Barthes, Foucault, and others."

Wilson, without condescension, and while maintaining the highest standards of literary excellence throughout his long career, succeeded in conveying the importance and delights of literature to the general reader more prolifically and more eloquently than any other critic of his time. Though he took issue with the New Humanism of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, Wilson is arguably the critic who did most in the 20th century to keep alive and enrich that humanist tradition. Even in so personal an essay as the moving tribute to Edna St. Vincent Millay that closes *The Shores of Light*, Wilson's praise of his onetime lover's lyric poetry articulates and reaffirms the humanistic view of literature's importance:

> [I]n giving supreme expression to profoundly felt human experience, she was able to identify herself with more general human experience and stand forth as a spokesman for the human spirit, announcing its predicaments, its vicissitudes, but, as a master of human expression, by the splendor of expression itself, putting herself beyond common embarrassments, common oppressions and panics. This is man who surveys himself and the world in which he moves, not the beast that scurries and suffers; and the name of the poet comes no longer to indicate a mere individual with a birthplace and a legal residence, but to figure as one of the pseudonyms assumed by that spirit itself.

As Dabney observes accurately, that Wilson upheld the "classical premise that literature delights and teaches, invigorating the life of society and the language of ordinary men and women" may discredit him among academics in thrall to the current campus orthodoxies. Dabney's fine biography reminds the rest of us why Edmund Wilson's writings themselves continue to both teach and delight. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ode to Joy

Freedom was Friedrich Schiller's muse.

BY ALGIS VALIUNAS

This year was the 200th anniversary of the death of Friedrich Schiller, after his dearest friend Goethe, the most superb peak in Germany's literary mountain range: dramatist, historian, philosopher, poet celebrated for *An die Freude*, the "Ode to Joy" that Beethoven set in his Ninth Symphony.

The Germans still treat Schiller as a revered eminence, though their appreciation has acquired some 21st-century kinks. The national tourist board promoted the bicentennial as a veritable Schiller lovefest, replete with the usual high-mindedness—museum exhibitions, theatrical productions, lofty speeches—but also with the odd emission from the dogpile: a play showing the free-spirit Schiller hassled by airport security, a comic book version of his life published by the Schiller National Museum and the Archive of German Literature.

The distinctive quality of Schiller's genius naturally prompts questions about high and low, in art, thought, politics, morality. For Schiller, born in 1759, stands among the greatest figures at the inauguration of the democratic era, when no dream of the future seemed too bold or too splendid to be realized. And Schiller's was one of the boldest minds of the time, espousing the most noble conception of freedom's true meaning for the new order. To ask how congenial that mind appears today, when the civilized world enjoys freedom, equality, and their attendant democratic goods to an unexampled degree, is to search not only Schiller's essence but also our own.

Thomas Carlyle, who literally wrote the book on hero-worship, observes in his *Life of Schiller* (1825) that future generations around the world will venerate him as the Germans do, "for such nobleness of heart and soul shadowed forth in beautiful imperishable emblems, is a treasure which belongs not to one nation, but to all." That Carlyle's biography remains the best-known life of Schiller available in English indicates a shortfall in the worldwide veneration market. But this neglect only makes one doubly grateful to have Carlyle, whose enthusiasm for moral, intellectual, and literary excellence—the highest nobility, he calls it—makes him Schiller's ideal biographer.

Schiller was born in Marbach, a small town in the Duchy of Württemberg. His parents were humble in station—his father's loyal service to the Duke of Württemberg as army surgeon and adjutant in war earned him a peacetime job as nurseryman—but elevated in spirit. Father and son shared a gravely joyous piety, and young Schiller envisioned a life in the church. The Duke, however, had other plans for him, and strong-armed his parents into sending the 14-year-old boy to a newly founded academy for the sons of officers. There Schiller moped and languished in the study of law, then languished and moped in the study of medicine.

History, drama, poetry—Plutarch, Shakespeare, the young Goethe—ravished him, and he began to write. He concealed this activity from the authorities—"any tendency toward poetry is an offense against the rules of the Institution," he noted—while he pursued his medical studies. In 1778 he completed the first draft of his tragedy *Die Rauber* (*The Robbers*), but kept it under wraps until 1780, when his commission as a regimental surgeon came through. No bookseller could be found to publish the play, so Schiller went into debt to publish 800 copies at his own expense. The Duke of Württemberg, a fan of Racine and Corneille, took a dim view of Schiller's Romantic extravagances, told him he would do well to stick to doctoring, and directed him to submit any future works for prior approval.

The determined Schiller went AWOL to see his first play's first production, at the Mannheim National Theater, and the audience's response confirmed him in his renegade vocation. Molten rapture overcame the theatergoers; earnest Teutonic eyes wept hot torrents, or rolled back into their sockets, and smitten ladies needed manly assistance to remain upright. The duke, however, was not smitten, and had Schiller arrested for truancy; when Schiller bolted for the theater again, dire warnings informed him he had better stay put.

The next time Schiller slipped out of the Duke's grasp for good, to Franconia, in 1782, living under an alias for a time. The Mannheim theatrical producer sent him survival funds, a gracious lady who admired his writing took him in, and he set to work with everything he had. Within a year he produced two more tragedies, *Die Verschwörung des Fiesco* (*Fiesco's Conspiracy*) and *Kabale und Liebe* (*Intrigue and Love*). The plays premiered in Mannheim, audiences loved them, and the post of poet to the theater became his. Esteemed and endowed with a sufficient living, Schiller devoted himself to literature with preternatural diligence, and pursued a life of the utmost seriousness.

The theater does not readily lend itself to such a life—one has to deal with actors—and after the immense success of *Don Carlos* in 1785, Schiller turned to the more sober practice of writing history. The Spanish prince Don Carlos's 1568 plot against his father King Philip II's brutal imperial rule of Holland (the intrigue was largely Schiller's fabrication) so amused Schiller that he wrote a *History of the Revolt of the United Netherlands from*

Algis Valiunas is a writer in Florida.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spanish Rule (1788)—tribute to the early stirrings of freedom and enlightenment. He finished only the first volume, but what he had written made an impression sufficient to gain him the chair in history at the University of Jena. Getting tenure did not diminish his productivity. His *History of the Thirty Years' War* appeared in 1791.

The years from 1790 to 1794 were momentous in other respects. In 1790 Schiller married Charlotte von Lengefeld, imagining that an epoch of unrelenting personal happiness was about to begin; and indeed, he would always be a loving and beloved husband and father. But the next year tribulation struck: an illness, perhaps tuberculosis, perhaps chronic peritonitis, that would plague him for the rest of his life.

Besides work and family, what sustained him through his pain was his friendship with Goethe. Thomas Mann, whose extraordinary essay "On Schiller" was written for the 150th anniversary of Schiller's death, calls this friendship "the great adventure of his life." The two men first met in 1788, and each immediately rubbed the other the wrong way. Schiller wrote to a friend in 1789 that he could not possibly be happy in the regular company of this egotistical cold fish, though he loved Goethe's mind. Goethe reciprocated both the unease and the intellectual admiration; his putting in a good word with the Duke of Weimar was crucial in securing Schiller's professorship. Still, they were not quite friends until, in 1794, Schiller started a literary journal, *Die Horen* (*The Hours*) and asked Goethe to be a collaborator.

Collaboration bred sympathy and warmth and deep connection. After Schiller wrote a letter describing Goethe to himself as the perfected union of philosophical seriousness and intuitive understanding, Goethe replied, "I will be happy to share everything about myself with you." Their correspondence ran to over a thousand letters; they joined forces to write a book of satiric epigrams, *Xenien*; and they presided over perhaps the most distinguished literary magazine ever. As Jena was not far from Goethe's home of Weimar, they saw each other often; and in 1799 Schiller closed that distance by moving to Weimar.

Their friendship was the encounter of two contrasting types of spiritual beauty: Goethe the force of nature, blessedly vigorous in constitution, certain of his creative instincts and uninhibited by the need to explain himself to himself; Schiller the man driven to overcome his own nature, feeling himself baffled as a poet by his need to philosophize and vitiated as a philosopher by his predilection for poetry, requiring every bit of his physical and moral strength to exercise his remarkable gifts and never quite satisfied with the performance.

Schiller did not hesitate to acknowledge Goethe the superior being. Goethe, for his part, loved the incomparable courage with which Schiller confronted the ordeals that writing and living presented to him.

What Schiller accomplished in the time left him was prodigious. Under the influence of Kant, he wrote philosophical essays, most notably *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1794) and *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry* (1795). In 1796 he returned to writing plays, mostly on historical subjects: first the magnificent trilogy *Wallenstein* (1799), then *Maria Stuart* (1800), *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* (*The Maid of Orleans*, 1801), *Die Braut von Messina* (*The Bride of Messina*, 1803), *Wilhelm Tell* (1804), and *Demetrius*, left unfinished at his death. He wrote ballads that generations of German schoolchildren learned by heart. With his left hand he translated *Macbeth*, Carlo Gozzi's *Turandot*, and Racine's *Phedre* for the Weimar stage. Two weeks before his death in 1805 he was suggesting emendations to the notes for Goethe's translation of *Rameau's Nephew* by Diderot, and disparaging the "soft character" of Louis XIV.

Death must have come as a relief, but even so it arrived far too soon.

Conducting Beethoven's Ninth Symphony in Berlin to celebrate the Wall's coming down, Leonard Bernstein ordered a change in Schiller's text for the convulsive final movement: *Freude*, or joy, was to be sung *Freiheit*, or freedom. At the time, the two words did seem interchangeable, and Schiller's vision of universal brotherhood appeared a real possibility to some, as it must have to Schiller himself at democracy's dawning.

Karl Moor, the hero of *The Robbers*, meditates on ancient greatness and contemporary mediocrity, and envisions the new birth of freedom that will dissolve pernicious aristocratic convention and restore nature to its rightful supremacy:

> The law never yet made a great man, but freedom will breed a giant, a colossus. . . . Give me an army of fellows like me to command, and I'll turn Germany into a republic that will make Rome and Sparta look like nunneries.

In *Intrigue and Love*, Luise Miller, a musician's daughter in love with a nobleman, longs for the egalitarian society in which character shall be the measure of nobility:

> "Then, mother . . . then, when the barriers of discrimination collapse . . . when all the hateful husks of rank burst from us . . . and human beings are only human beings . . . I shall bring nothing with me but my innocence. Father has so often said, you know, that adornment and splendid titles will be cheap when God comes, and hearts will rise in price. Then I shall be rich. Then tears will be reckoned as triumphs, and beautiful thoughts as ancestors. Then I shall be aristocratic, mother!

Personal fulfillment requires political justice. For Schiller, republican freedom is the ground for every virtue and for every benefit fortune bestows. It is indispensable for the happiness of the good and the great.

In subsequent plays, Schiller works these themes on a larger stage, where the fate of entire peoples is at stake. The outstanding figure in *Don Carlos* is the marquis of Posa, the prophet of liberalism who implores King Philip to renounce religious absolutism and political tyranny, and to bring the new world order into being: "Give back nobility to humankind . . . Can there be any / Holier duty than equality?" Wallenstein, one of the greatest gen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Corbis / Richard Klune

erals of the Thirty Years' War, imagines Germany free from Swedish predation and all Europe blessed with religious tolerance and peace under the imperial authority he intends to usurp.

Wilhelm Tell assassinates the viperous Hapsburg proconsul who stands in the way of Swiss freedom, and gives life to the words of one of his most eloquent countrymen, who sounds rather like one of our own most eloquent countrymen: "When men oppressed cannot find justice, when / The burden gets to be unbearable— / Then they with confidence and courage reach / To Heaven and fetch their eternal rights / From where they hang as indestructible / And as inalienable as stars themselves."

There is no writer more rousing in the praise of the republican virtues than Schiller. Yet although his heroes and heroines do have a tendency to declaim into the megaphone, the plays are by no means mere instruments of political uplift. Indeed, with the exception of *Wilhelm Tell*, they are tragedies in which the noble souls struggling for freedom are overcome. The latent greatness of Karl Moor is twisted by the evil machinations of his brother Franz into a desperate perversity. Rather than lead a republican army, Karl heads a gang of robbers, and the life of crime does not sit well with his exquisite soul. Madness overcomes this innately virtuous man who has blighted his life and can never atone; he causes his father's death, murders the woman he loves, then decides to surrender to the authorities, letting a poor day-laborer claim the bounty on his head.

The noble love of Luise Miller and Ferdinand von Walter is twisted by the evil machinations of his father, President von Walter, into a mortal affliction: duped into believing Luise unfaithful, Ferdinand poisons her and himself. For King Philip II and the grand inquisitor, evil machinations are routine procedure. The dreams of liberation that Posa and Carlos entertain are crushed by the baneful conjunction of Machiavellian hunger for power and majesty with religious oppression. Wallenstein, the man who deserves to rule by virtue of his greatness in war and love of peace, is destroyed by the mediocrities who command by virtue of birth alone, and who could never have accomplished what he did.

Written during the revolutionary era, and often set centuries earlier, Schiller's plays reckon the terrible price of freedom—a freedom that many yearned for but never enjoyed, and that was not a secure possession in Schiller's own time. Schiller's heroic souls trying to break free from the stifling aristocratic order are not equal to the evildoers who wield power under an ancient regime. Conventional nobility knows just where to insert the knife into natural nobility.

The perfectly named Wurm, minion to President von Walter in *Intrigue and Love*, sums up the plight of ethereal liberalism as he instructs his master how best to separate Ferdinand from the unsuitable Luise: "What good would fanciful dreams about greatness of soul and personal nobility be anyway at a court where the greatest wisdom is that of being great and small in proper tempo and in a skillful way?"

Conventional nobility in Schiller's world comes armed with Machiavellian intelligence, which loves power and privilege, and which knows what it must do to keep them. Natural nobility is the dreamy child of Rousseau-style sentiment, which reveres the primacy of love, beginning with the erotic and the familial, then expanding to embrace one's nation, and eventually all humanity. The Machiavellian is superior to the disciple of Rousseau in cunning and strength, inferior in the moral essentials. Schiller tends to present the two in stark, even lurid, contrast.

But his most complicated moral portraits disclose the need even of the power-loving for a finer love, and register the pathos of their failure to sustain the requisite purity of heart. King Philip is aflame with admiration for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Posa, the real man and true friend he prays God to send him, but he orders Posa's death just the same. Queen Elizabeth in *Mary Stuart* wants Leicester to love her more than he does Mary, but in the end forces him to be complicit in Mary's execution, and thereby provokes him to leave England. As terrible as the spectacle of innocence broken is that of corrupt power longing for innocence, and unable to recover it from the ruins of one's soul.

Still, Schiller's heart bleeds not nearly so much for morally ambivalent rulers—however painful their turmoil—as for the ordinary people who must endure their overlords' destructive whims. *The Thirty Years' War* examines the difference between what princes are willing to expend their subjects' lives for, and what those subjects think they are killing and dying for: Schiller declares that the greatest war of religion, between Catholic and Protestant, was in fact fought principally for the usual worldly ends, though most of the participants failed to realize it.

That faith can so easily be turned into an instrument of ambitious violence is perhaps the most damning indictment of religion there is. Schiller rails at this unholy folly after the Enlightenment fashion of Voltaire and Diderot, though his consternation is a far cry from their clever sneering. The 1631 massacre at Magdeburg, in which some 30,000 civilians were butchered, shows holy wars for what they are: "Here commenced a scene of horrors for which history has no language, poetry no pen. Neither innocent childhood, nor helpless old age; neither youth, sex, rank, nor beauty could disarm the fury of the conquerors. Wives were abused in the arms of their husbands, daughters at the feet of their parents; and the defenseless sex exposed to the double sacrifice of virtue and life. . . . In a single church fifty-three women were found beheaded. The Croats amused themselves with throwing children into the flames; Pappenheim's Walloons with stabbing infants at the mother's breast."

It happened to be the Catholic forces that did these things on this particular occasion, in the name of Christ; but to Schiller it really does not matter. Both sides committed similar atrocities, and—although Schiller does honor the comparative decency of certain generals, most notably King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden—both are condemned.

From this descent into unreason, however, a more rational political order emerged: ". . . [O]ut of this fearful war Europe came forth free and independent. In it she first learned to recognize herself as a community of nations; and this intercommunion of states, which originated in the Thirty Years' War, may alone be sufficient to reconcile the philosopher to its horrors." The "general sympathy" among nations that the war indirectly encouraged has kept the peace ever since, Schiller exults—somehow overlooking the general conflagration ignited by Louis XIV and, of course, unaware (as he was writing in 1791) that Napoleon was just coming into his full growth.

Yet surely he is correct in discerning a relative tolerance and peaceableness, however misshapen and incomplete, in Europe after the Thirty Years' War. And that led him to nurse hopes for the unexampled future in which, as he writes in the "Ode to Joy," *Alle Menschen werden Bruder*—all men become brothers.

Schiller believed that if that future was to be realized, its spiritual life would have to be based on some more stable foundation than the old-time religion. He longed for a democratic age in which experience of the highest things was readily available, and he thought aesthetic rapture, of a profoundly reasonable sort, the surest means of such transcendence—the safest means as well, for he did not suppose men would slaughter each other over poems or pictures.

In "On the Pathetic" (1703), Schiller rhapsodizes on poetry's capacity to transform one's entire being, to irradiate one with the full sense of possibilities, and to steel one's resolve to make the best of those possibilities real. "Poetry can come to be for the human being what love is for the hero," he wrote. "It can neither counsel him nor join him in battle nor otherwise do any work for him, but it can develop him into a hero, call him to action, and equip him with the strength to be everything he ought to be."

Certainly that is what it did for Schiller. In *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, he dilates eloquently on art and beauty as indispensable to human happiness and to the formation of "what is noblest in our moral nature." At a time when political practicality—"the construction of true political freedom"—preoccupies thinkers and seems to leave no room for thoughts about art, Schiller insists that this very democratic temper, which increases the emphasis on utility and quashes imagination, makes art all the more essential. Poetry is greater, even than philosophy, the philosopher-poet declares, for only art can make man whole, harmonizing his sensual and rational natures.

"We know that it is precisely play and play *alone*, which of all man's states and conditions makes him whole and unfolds both sides of his nature at once," says Schiller. True freedom is conditional upon this wholeness; it "arises only when man is a *complete* being." The same word *freedom* describes both the great political virtue and the great moral virtue; but the political freedom that claims every man's every thought is only the means to moral freedom, which is the highest end of democratic politics. Schiller hopes to found a republic of whole men and women, noble and beautiful souls. Ideally, he writes in his closing passage, aesthetic rapture is available to all, and makes each the equal of every other; in reality, he goes on, it is the preserve of those who have cultivated the noblest strain in themselves.

In his emphasis on the meaning of nobility for democratic times, Schiller joins the three supreme artists of the republican era: Mozart, Goethe, and Beethoven. When the artificial hierarchy that defined aristocratic society has crumbled, the natural distinctions among men remain, and a new order of rank emerges, based on moral quality. Mozart's greatest operas expose the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mores of the old regime as a patchwork of vanity and injustice, show the delusional self-regard of hereditary nobility fading to black, and assert the moral supremacy of nature as truly noble hearts know it.

In Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (*Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, 1795), the hero is an ordinary man who wants to live a noble life but doesn't really know how. Receiving invaluable guidance from a secret brotherhood, he ends up far removed from his youthful fantasies, but finds genuine nobility in love, work, and fraternity.

With the Razumovsky quartets (1806), Beethoven breaks from the aristocratic tradition of decorous sentiment decorously expressed, and introduces into chamber music the nobility of democratic fellow-feeling, torrential and overwhelming. In his only opera, *Fidelio* (1805), he honors the indomitable love of Leonore for her husband, Florestan, a political prisoner whom she frees from the dungeon, along with others suffering unjustly. And in the Ninth Symphony (1824), from the launching pad of the contented bourgeois order, he hurtles in the direction of the ultimate mysteries, with Schiller's assistance.

It was during the earliest days of the democratic age that these voices rang out, announcing "the universal eligibility to be noble," in the phrase of that spiritual aristocrat, Augie March. Schiller was of that company—living a noble life, and wanting nobility for as many men as possible. There is no voice like his today.

Two magnificent achievements stand out from the early democratic days. The first is the American founding, which established, on modest but solid grounds, a regime of the rarest decency; *security*—a government and social fabric made to last—was the watchword of the authors of the Federalist Papers, and it remains the best thing we have. The second magnificent achievement is the art and thought of Friedrich Schiller and those few other men of like quality. They remind us of the nobility that our freedom makes possible, and ask us to think hard about the way we live now, and about the way we don't live now. ♦

Keeping it Real

From Schubert to Shakur, musical violence is an old story. BY JOE QUEENAN

The recent shooting of record mogul Suge Knight at a music industry celebration has evoked the usual hand-wringing about mindless violence in the world of rap. The incident is merely the latest, and by no means the most deplorable, in a wave of crime that dates back to the murders of Notorious B.I.G. and Tupac Shakur. In addition to shootings involving musicians, producers, and industry executives, there have been several outright attacks on journalists who dared to be critical of ranking figures in the hip-hop underworld.

But two new books contend that violent internecine behavior has been a staple of the Western music industry since at least the late 18th century—and may date back even further. What's more, it did not start in Los Angeles, Harlem, or Detroit. It started in Vienna.

"Ludwig Van Beethoven pistol-whipped Franz Schubert when the gifted dwarf foolishly trashed the *D Major Piano Sonata, Opus 10, Number 3*," notes John Parella, author of *Bitch Slappers of the High Romantic Era*. "Beethoven could read lips, and when he realized what Schubert had said, he totaled his face. Beethoven also used to call him 'Lunger' after he found out Schubert was dying of T.B. A real S.O.B."

Beethoven was by no means the only titan of 19th-century music to engage in such despicable mayhem. "Franz Liszt was known to open a can of whup-ass whenever Robert Schumann got on his case in the *Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung*," notes Parella. "When white slaver Hector Berlioz came to town, it was lock-up-your-daughters time if you even hinted that the second act of *Les Troyens* dragged a bit. The outrageous behavior we associate with Eminem, Lil' Kim, and The Artist Formerly Known as Puff Daddy, Sean John, P. Diddy, *et al*, is merely a continuation of a long tradition that dates back to the earliest days of Western music."

As is the case today, when gangsta rappers have been known to menace journalists who dare to criticize their recordings, great musicians of past eras were not above taking up the cudgels in defense of their work.

"Like most musicians of the time, Giuseppe Verdi was 'connected,'" asserts Sonia Javala, author of *The Ass Whippers of Parnassus*. "If you wrote anything negative about him, you were likely to get a visit from one of the 'capable men' he hung around with. On at least ten occasions, Verdi was hauled in for questioning in connection with the blinding, flaying, or ceremonial disembowelment of a critic. But no one dared testify against him, dreading what the Puccini Brothers would do to their loved ones."

George Santayana famously declared that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. Yet this is certainly what is happening in the world of music criticism today, where collective amnesia seems to be rampant. The "*O tempora! O Mores!*" crowd are forever bellyaching about Paradise Lost, about a golden Edenic moment when musicians did not empty their AK-47s into one another at awards ceremonies, when singers did not engage in violent public feuds with their competitors, when everybody was basically quite civil.

The sad truth is: This arcadian world never existed.

"How do you think the *castrato* tra-

Joe Queenan is the author, most recently, of Queenan Country: A Reluctant Anglophile's Pilgrimage to the Mother Country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED


Bettmann / Corbis

Franz Schubert


Splash News / Ronald Asadorian

Suge Knight

dition got started?" queries a befuddled Parella. "Christoph Gluck got so pissed off when a Bavarian *heldentenor* dissed him at *L'Opera Comique* that he hired three rakish musketeers to geld him. The castration was a mixed blessing—the man went on to become one of the most famous singers in Europe—but he would have hung on to the crown jewels if he hadn't asked Louis XV, 'Hey, what rhymes with Gluck?'"

Javala stresses that it was not only the hotheads—Beethoven, Verdi, Paganini, and Liszt—who liked to mix it up back in the 19th century. Though Chopin's manicured profile as the doomed, effeminate expatriate is now the stuff of legend, the great composer was feared and loathed in his own time because of his unfathomable cruelty and depraved disregard for human life.

"Chopin—the Hammer of Krakow to his contemporaries—liked to stick critics' heads inside a piano and have circus animals jump up down on the lid for a few hours," reports Javala. "If you crossed him, you could just kiss your girlfriend goodbye. Chopin was all about bitches and hos."

Javala says that these incidents were widely reported at the time, but have been obscured by musicologists and cultural historians who want the public to believe that only pop stars engage in such murderous vendettas.

"Maurice Ravel beat Erik Satie half to death with a tire iron because Satie said that *Valses Nobles et Sentimentales* were gay," he reports. "What's more, the beating took place in Claude Debussy's basement, with François Poulenc, Charles Gounod, and Gabriel Fauré looking on. But when the gendarmes showed up, lo and behold, no one had seen a thing."

Obviously, not every great composer was a thug. Dvorak was gentle as a lamb, as were Elgar, Grieg, Scriabin, and Cherubini. Anton Bruckner stabbed only one rival in the retina his entire life, and always claimed that he'd mistaken Richard Strauss for an intruder. But for every meek and mild Bruckner there was a stone-cold psychopath like Johannes Brahms.

"Brahms blinded his first agent, fed his publisher's right ear to his pet piranha, Sasha, and paid to have an opera critic gang-raped by lovesick Montenegrin goatherds," says Javala. "And Brahms didn't even write operas. So the next time you hear someone complaining about rappers, just remind them: Gangstas are pussycats compared with late 19th-century German post-Romantic composers. And don't even get me started on Rimsky-Korsakov and that crew!" ♦

Corbis

Maurice Ravel


Zuma / Toronto Star

Tupac Shakur

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books in Brief

The Christmas season invites us to indulge some of our quirkier interests in the publishing world, and recommend a few unconventional delights for readers on your list.

We begin with ***What the Dog Did: Tales From a Formerly Reluctant Dog Owner*** **by Emily Yoffe (Bloomsbury, 256 pp., $23.95).** A veteran freelancer and semi-reformed cat person, Ms. Yoffe yielded to her family's entreaties and adopted a beagle, which, in turn, has led to a fruitful association with Beagle Rescue Education and Welfare (BREW), and a succession of foster hounds whose stories compose the bulk of this splendid volume. As readers of these pages will know, it is difficult to think of a more richly comic breed than the beagle, and Emily Yoffe's dry humor, pointed insights, and infinite patience produce a riotous, and rewarding, read for anyone who has ever observed dogs in action—or inaction.

If, however, the human element is essential, may we introduce ***Hoover the Fishing President: Portrait of the Private Man and His Life Outdoors*** **by Hal Elliott Wert (Stackpole, 416 pp., $29.95).** Herbert Hoover is not the most popular of our presidents, but he was a man of extraordinary gifts and accomplishment, and the supreme humanitarian among commanders in chief. In the guise of an account of Hoover's career as an angler, Wert has drawn a charming portrait of the Midwestern orphan who put himself through Stanford, made a fortune as a globetrotting engineer/businessman, fed the starving Europeans, invented modern public administration, and believed (as he said) that "all men are equal in the eyes of fish."

For the inevitable Civil War buff on your list, ***Virginia at War: 1861,*** **edited by William C. Davis and James I. Robertson Jr. (Kentucky, 241 pp., $35)** is an essential addition to the library. The first of five projected volumes sponsored by the Virginia Center for Civil War Studies, this is a superb collection of essays, edited by two distinguished historians, on the conflict in the state that was not only the capital of the Confederacy, but also the primary battleground of the struggle.

And now on to the coffee table. Somewhere just short of that category may be found ***Darwin: Discovering the Tree of Life*** **by Niles Eldredge (Norton, 288 pp., $35).** Using Charles Darwin's notes from his voyage to the Galapagos Islands and South America, Eldredge, a curator at the American Museum of Natural History, traces the development of evolutionary theory, and describes Darwin's struggles and inner torments with uncommon skill. This is very much a book for the general reader interested in an introduction to the greatest scientific mind of the 19th century, and contains dozens of fascinating sketches, photographs, paintings, and manuscript excerpts.

Four other volumes deserve commendation. ***The Smaller Majority: The Hidden World of the Animals That Dominate the Tropics*** **by Piotr Naskrecki (Belknap/Harvard, 288 pp., $35)** is a hypnotic collection of intimate photographs of tiny frogs, startling reptiles, lush butterflies, and hundreds of creatures of indescribable appearance found on leaves, in sand, on water, in the air, in repose, on twigs and branches, and in combat as well as domestic tranquility. The subjects are all smaller than the human finger, but, microscopic or not, loom larger than life.

Lawrence of Arabia: The Life, The Legend **by Malcolm Brown (Thames & Hudson, 208 pp., $45)** may not succeed in decoding the mystery of T.E. Lawrence, but it gathers a lot of compelling photographs around an informative text, and goes some distance in explaining the lure of the Arab world to that tortured Oxford archaeologist, as well as the Arab revolt against Ottoman tyranny, and the balance of Lawrence's strange, self-mortifying life. Contemporary photographs are nicely mixed with modern scenes, all interspersed with relevant passages from letters, press accounts, and *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*.

True to the Letter: 800 Years of Remarkable Correspondence, Documents and Autographs **by Pedro Corrêa do Lago (Thames & Hudson, 288 pp., $70)** suggests that the next best thing to meeting and conversing with figures from the historic past is close proximity to their written remains. Here is a letter written by Queen Elizabeth I on the opening day of her reign (1558), in which she neglects to add the 'R' for Regina, and a receipt for services rendered (1516), endorsed by Raphael. It is both amusing and instructive to read a birthday letter from Freud to his 94-year-old mother (1929) and examine Proust's corrected proofs (1913) for *Swann's Way*.

Writers of the American South: Their Literary Landscapes **by Hugh Howard, photographs by Roger Straus III (Rizzoli, 286 pp., $35)** appeals to those of us with a certain curiosity about the way some people live. Most of the usual suspects are here—William Faulkner's Rowan Oak, Flannery O'Connor's Georgia farmhouse—as well as Eudora Welty's staid bedroom and Peter Taylor's elegant study. The photographs are spare, polished, even serene; but some of the writers (Carl Hiaasen, Ernest Hemingway) are "southern" by virtue of residence in south Florida—and, certainly in Hiaasen's case, in company well over their head.

—Philip Terzian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iran's hardline president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that if Germany and Austria feel responsible for massacring Jews during World War II, a state of Israel should be established on their soil. —News item

Parody

DAY, DECEMBER 14, 2005 ONE DOLLAR CHEAP

GERMANY, AUSTRIA STRIKE ACCORD: ISRAEL TO MOVE TO LIECHTENSTEIN

RESISTANCE ON THE SLOPES

By RICHARD BERNSTEIN

VADUZ, Dec. 13 — In a gesture seen clearly as an overture towards Iran, Germany and Austria have agreed to move the state of Israel to Liechtenstein, a principality bordering Austria and Switzerland and roughly the size of Washington, D.C.

Just last week, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told an Arabic-language channel that Germany and Austria should bear the burden of an Israeli state, not Palestine: "You oppressed them, so give a part of Europe to the Zionist entity so they can establish any government they want. We would support it."

According to those involved in the negotiations, it was that key mention of "support" that made the deal possible. "We take the president at his word and are eager to obtain any support from him in the hopes that our nuclear talks may resume," said a representative of the E.U.-3. "This is a major breakthrough at a modest price."

At the moment, the population of Liechtenstein is about 34,000. After the move, scheduled to commence next month, that number is expected to increase to 6.3 million, most of whom will be Jewish. Liechtenstein's current Jewish population is 32.

While some Europeans are expressing satisfaction over the agreement, not everyone is pleased with the result. "My fellow Liechtensteiners are rightly upset that this decision was imposed on us," said chief of state Prince Hans Adam II. "They really should have talked to us first. I think Andorra would have been a better fit." Some Liechtensteiners have reportedly fled with nothing but their ski boots to the nearest chalet or lodge, where organized resistance is expected.

Prince Alois, heir to the throne, did not mince words. "If they expect to come here and go snowboarding on our slopes and drink our heisse Schokolade, they are sorely mistaken." He continued, "We will not take this sitting down in our ski lifts. This isn't St. Moritz." One Liechtenstein baron warned that Germans and Austrians alike will be held responsible for this decision. "None of them shall be spared the wrath of our snowballs."

Anticipating such resistance, Germany's foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier announced plans for his country to offer free ski lessons to the Israelis. "While we can't send ski instructors to Liechtenstein, we will be more than happy to train Israelis in nearby Bavaria." Steinmeier said his country has already deployed more than its share of ski instructors around the world, including Telluride.

Continued on Page A26

Jason Andrews for PGWN News

Israeli on Ice: In preparation for the move to Liechtenstein, a Mossad agent learns to ski at an undisclosed location. The newly formed IAF (Israeli Alpine Force) expects stern resistance from native Liechtensteiners around resorts.

Baby Panda Too Cute For Words; Editors Urge End To "Panda-ring"

By SETH ZIMMERMAN

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 — A national association of editors announced today that after weeks of relentless coverage, newpapers across the country have fully exhausted all available puns to describe Tai Shan, the newest panda at the National Zoo. "It's Panda-monium!" ran the headline in multi-

This was followed shortly by "Panda-monium Ensues," "Even More Panda-monium," and "Tai Shan Prince." More obscure references included "Panda-gruel" and "Panda-gyric."

'ONE NIGHT IN BANGKOK': MINNESOTA VIKINGS PLAN PLAYOFF PARTY

'CULTURAL EXCHAN

MINNEAPOL
officials in
Vikin

the weekly Standard
DECEMBER 19, 2005

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cutting-Edge Commentary on Public Policy

HOOVER DIGEST
RESEARCH AND OPINION ON PUBLIC POLICY

FREE ISSUE

Receive a complimentary issue of the latest Digest without obligation.

Call 800.935.2882 or visit www.hooverdigest.org

In the new issue of the Hoover Digest . . .

Sleepwalking Moralists

Present-day moralists lecture the civilized but ignore the brutes.

To paraphrase the ancient Greeks, it is easy to be moral in your sleep. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other global humanitarian groups recently expressed criticism over the slated trial of the accused mass murderer Saddam Hussein. Such self-appointed auditors of moral excellence were worried that his legal representation was inadequate. Or perhaps they felt the court of the new Iraqi democracy was not quite up to the standards of wigged European judges in The Hague. Relay those concerns to the nearly one million silent souls butchered by Saddam's dictatorship. Once they waited in vain for any such international human rights organizations to stop the murdering. None could or did. Sleepwalking moralizers chastise those who listen and are civilized—but see nothing, hear nothing, and speak nothing about those in the moral abyss.

—Victor Davis Hanson

Back to the USSR

They've gotten used to freedom, so why do Russians still yearn for the old days?

Is Putin's long-run aim to restore the old Soviet Union? Russians always insist that it would be impossible to turn back the clock. Yet there is a discernible nostaligia for the terrible simplification of the old days. One recent poll found that 53 percent of Russians still regard Stalin as a great leader. The explanation is not far to seek: The collapse of communism has meant a dramatic decline in living standards. Since 1989, the Russian mortality rate has risen from below 11 per 1,000 to more than 15 per 1,000—nearly double the American rate. Whether Putin can raise living standards as quickly as they have been raised in China is a moot point. But what he can undoubtedly give Russians is a sense of geopolitical revival.

—Niall Ferguson

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

CALL 800.935.2882 TO RECEIVE A FREE ISSUE!

HOOVER INSTITUTION

. . . ideas defining a free society

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, Stanford California 94305-6010 Toll-free: 877.466.8374 Fax: 650.723.1687 info@hoover.stanford.edu www.hoover.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Home Values would be Sliced by 15%...

...that's a Bad Idea.

The **Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction** — it's been boosting homeownership for nearly a century. Now, some in Washington want to drastically reduce it.

More than 1.2 million REALTORS® urge the Administration and Congress to say "NO" to undermining this important incentive for homeowners. Reducing the Mortgage Interest Deduction would take a slice out of home values, hurting homeowners and the economy. That's a bad idea.

REALTOR®

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®

The Voice for Real Estate®

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED